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Abstract 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are often 
advocated by ecologists as a method of conserving 
valuable fish stocks while ensuring the integrity of 
ecological processes in the face of increasing 
anthropogenic disturbance. In the Turks and 
Caicos Islands there is little evidence that current 
MPAs are ecologically beneficial but there are 
indications that boundary changes may enhance 
queen conch and finfish production. 
Implementing boundary changes usually requires 
political will and, hence, quantifiable economic 
benefits. Assessing the value of reef fish is 
particularly important because they are 
potentially valuable for consumptive and non-
consumptive purposes. We demonstrate the non-
consumptive economic value of increased Nassau 
grouper size and abundance to the dive tourism 
industry through a paired comparison conjoint 
survey of visiting divers. Our results suggest that 
accounting for the non-consumptive economic 
value of increased Nassau grouper abundance 
and size may have a large impact on the economic 
viability of ecologically functional MPAs.  
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Introduction 
The inshore marine environment provides 
humans with a wide variety of ecological and 
economic services (Moberg and Folke, 1999) and 
is especially important in tropical developing 
countries where economic opportunities are 
limited. Many demersal fisheries operate at or 
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beyond their sustainable limits (National Marine 
Fisheries Service, 1997; National Research 
Council, 1999) and the demand for fish continues 
to grow. The management of a marine fishery is a 
difficult task (Botsford et al., 1997; Costanza et 
al., 1998) and in the tropics, where ecologically 
complex ecosystems are under heavy pressure 
from rapidly increasing anthropogenic stress and 
are typically managed by institutionally weak 
governments, the problem is exacerbated 
(Roberts and Polunin, 1993; Roberts, 1997; 
Johannes, 1998; Mascia, 2000).  
Traditional fisheries management has focused on 
the optimal exploitation of individual stocks of 
commercially important species despite the fact 
that most demersal fisheries involve multiple 
species. Regulatory approaches aim to control 
either fishing mortality and/or effort by means of 
quotas, gear restrictions, size limits, vessel 
permits, and/or seasonal closure (King, 1995). 
These strategies often have high transaction costs 
(North, 1990) and are thus ineffective in many 
cases (Roberts, 1997).  
In the tropics, the management of the inshore 
environment has proved problematic due to the 
complexity of the dynamic coral reef – seagrass – 
mangrove ecosystem and confounding 
anthropogenic pressure (Johannes, 1998). Many 
tropical species are particularly vulnerable to 
overexploitation due to the wide variety of fishing 
methods used in artisanal commercial reef 
fisheries (Munro and Williams, 1985). Grouper, 
for example, comprise about 10% of the total 
coral reef finfish yield worldwide and is amongst 
the most endangered family. In 1996, 21 species 
of grouper were proposed for the IUCN ‘Red List’; 
of these three species are critically endangered 
(Hudson and Mace, 1996).  
In recent years, marine protected areas (MPAs) 
have received much attention as an alternative 
approach to traditional fisheries management 
(Plan Development Team, 1990; Roberts, 1997; 
Murray et al., 1999). Ecologically, MPAs are 
thought to be able to simultaneously address 
problems that traditional management cannot. 
The primary goals of MPAs are to protect critical 
habitat and biodiversity, and to sustain or 
enhance fisheries by preventing spawning stock 
collapse and providing recruitment to fished 
areas (Medley et al., 1993; Johnson et al., 1999; 
Murray et al., 1999).  
From an economic perspective, the use of MPAs 
offers several theoretical advantages over the 
traditional management measures. MPAs, like 
terrestrial protected areas, may provide 
substantial non-consumptive economic use value 
by providing opportunities for recreation, 
education, scientific research (Dixon, 1993; 
Ruitenbeek, 1999) and indirect use value by 
 199
increasing ecological resilience (Perrings et al., 
1995). Protected areas may also provide non-use 
values for humans who value the existence of 
protected environments and species even though 
they have no plans to personally visit or use them. 
In addition to providing value to humans through 
the provision of valuable ecological goods and 
services, MPAs have other potential advantages. 
Transaction costs (North, 1990) associated with 
information collection, contracting, monitoring 
and enforcement are potentially lower when using 
MPAs compared to other information-intensive 
fishery management tools (Roberts and Polunin, 
1993; Agardy, 1994; Costanza et al., 1998; 
Johannes, 1998; Mascia, 2000).  
Unless the ecological impacts of MPAs are 
demonstrated and linked directly with economic 
value, it is unlikely that decision-makers within 
government will consider MPAs as viable policy 
tools for managing coastal resources. In order to 
demonstrate the utility of MPAs, it is imperative 
that the potential economic benefits of marine 
conservation be clarified. A complete accounting 
of the benefits of conservation may actually help 
tip the balance of a cost-benefit analysis in favor 
of the conservation option. 
In the tropics, the tourism industry is an 
important part of many economies (ARA 
Consulting et al., 1996). Increasing demand for 
nature-based tourism ensures that protected 
areas (Gössling, 1999) and a healthy environment 
(Huybers and Bennett, 2000) are important 
production inputs for the tourism industry. 
Viewing wildlife is recognized as providing 
economic value to participants and is a basis for 
both terrestrial (Gössling, 1999) and marine (e.g., 
Loomis and Larson, 1994; Davis and Tisdell, 
1998) tourism industries.  
The objective of our study is to assess the 
existence of non-consumptive economic benefits 
of MPAs in the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI), 
British West Indies. We hypothesize that viewing 
healthy coral reefs and vibrant fish communities 
adds value to the experience of visiting tourists. 
Our research specifically examines the value of 
Nassau grouper (Epinephelus striatus) through a 
paired comparison conjoint survey. It assesses the 
added value that increased grouper size and 
abundance contributes to the dive experience for 
visiting divers to the TCI. In the balance of this 
paper, we outline the potential ecological benefits 
of MPAs in South Caicos, TCI. Next we outline a 
framework for assessing the potential economic 
value of these ecological benefits of MPAs. We 
then review the paired comparison survey 
methodology and results, and conclude with a 
discussion on the implications of the results for 
the TCI dive industry and government policy 
makers. 
The Turks and Caicos Islands 
The Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) are located at 
the southern end of the Bahamian archipelago 
and are relatively pristine compared to other 
countries in the Greater Caribbean basin. 
Commercial fishing for spiny lobster (Panulirus 
argus) and queen conch (Strombus gigas) has 
been a mainstay of the local economy for decades 
but tourism emerged as the number one industry 
in the country by the early 1990s (Turks and 
Caicos Islands Government, 1996). While the 
pristine reefs are a prime attraction for tourists, 
increasing tourism is putting pressure on the 
nearshore coral reef environment. Growing 
tourism combined with tariff protection for the 
TCI fishing industry has led to an expansion in 
the market demand for local seafood and resulted 
in increasing fishing pressure on potentially 
vulnerable stocks of conch, lobster and 
carnivorous reef fish such as groupers, snappers 
and grunts (Christian-Smith and Darian, 2000). 
A National Parks Order formally established 33 
terrestrial and marine protected areas in 1992 
(Homer, 2000). Government management of 
MPAs has been in a state of flux over the last ten 
years and there is currently a restructuring in 
process that will soon cleave responsibility for 
park operation away from the Department of 
Environmental and Coastal Resources (DECR) to 
a new National Park Service (NPS).  
There are four designated MPAs on South Caicos: 
Admiral Cockburn Land and Sea National Park 
(ACLSNP); East Harbor Lobster and Conch 
Reserve (EHLCR); Admiral Cockburn Nature 
Reserve; and Bell Sound Nature Reserve. 
ACLSNP and EHLCR are adjacent (Figure 1) and 
effectively encompass the Admiral Cockburn 
Nature Reserve. The Bell Sound Reserve is on the 
north side of the island and was implemented to 
protect bonefish habitat and stocks. 
 
Bell Sound
Nature Reserve
Admiral Cockburn Land &
Sea National Park
(ACLSNP)
East Harbor Lobster
& Conch Reserve
(EHLCR)
South Caicos
Six Hills Cay
Long Cay
North
Figure 1: Marine Protected Areas of South Caicos, 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
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The Ecological Value of South Caicos MPA 
 
Spiny Lobster 
Stocks of spiny lobsters are heavily exploited 
around the world due to their high market value. 
From Bermuda to southern Brazil, Panulirus 
argus is one of the most heavily fished and 
commercially significant shellfish throughout its 
range (Butler and Herrnkind, 1997) and are the 
principal commercial fishery resource in the TCI. 
The fishery is managed by the DECR and 
management regulations include a closed season, 
an 83-mm minimum carapace length, a 
prohibition on the harvest of berried or tarred 
females, and a prohibition on the use of SCUBA 
or chemicals such as detergent or bleach. In 
addition, lobster fishing is prohibited in the South 
Caicos MPAs. 
Spiny lobster larvae are pelagic and individuals 
may remain in the water column from 6- to 12-
months and are therefore subject to dispersal 
over a range of hundreds or even thousands of 
kilometers (Lipcius and Cobb, 1994). This 
suggests that fluctuations in ocean currents may 
alter annual patterns of larval movement and 
make it difficult to causally link the effects of 
increased larval production within MPAs to 
fisheries benefits in other areas. 
Some evidence does show that MPAs protect 
juvenile lobsters until they mature and move out 
of the reserves into surrounding areas (Davis and 
Dodrill, 1985; MacDiarmid and Breen, 1993). 
However, empirical evidence demonstrating that 
populations of exploited species may recover is 
limited (Kelly et al., 2000a) and documented 
benefits of these reserves to the conservation and 
management of lobsters are sparse (Childress, 
1997).  
There is little fishing activity in the vicinity of the 
South Caicos MPAs while more distant fishing 
grounds outside the area are heavily exploited. 
Unpublished data collected by the Center for 
Marine Resource Studies (CMRS) shows the 
average length of lobster caught in several fishing 
grounds around South Caicos (Table 1). The 
average carapace length of lobsters from the 
shallow, sheltered and accessible areas such as 
Six Hills (8-km from the fishing port, Figure 1) is 
often under the 83-mm legal minimum. Remote 
areas that are deeper, less accessible and exposed 
to adverse sea conditions – such as East Side, 
Bush Cay and White Cay (up to 40-km from the 
harbor) – have much higher average lengths.  
 
Table 1: Mean Length (mm) of Lobsters Landed in 
Fishing Regions near South Caicos 
 
 Spiny Lobster Average Carapace Length (mm)
Sampling Period East Side Six Hills Bush Cay White Cay 
Fall 1993 101.2 88.0 99.1 101.0 
Spring 1994 114.4 77.3 106.6 101.5 
Summer 1994 102.1 78.8 105.7 111.0 
Summer 1998 100.7 80.8 97.5 97.5 
Fall 1998 103.0 83.0 101.0 101.0 
Average 104.3 81.6 102.0 102.4 
Legal minimum carapace length = 83 mm 
 
 
Many of the undersize lobster are landed early in 
the season during the phenomenon known locally 
as “The Big Grab” (Olguin et al., 1998). Any TCI 
citizen is entitled to a fishing license for a 
nominal fee and during the month of August 
many part-time fishers take leave from other jobs 
and travel to South Caicos for the lucrative 
opening of lobster season (August landings have 
accounted for 25% to 40% of total annual 
landings since 1989). These part-time fishers are 
not usually skilled free divers and their technical 
skill limits many of them to fishing shallower 
areas where lobsters are smaller.  
The catch trends from various areas, anecdotal 
information from fishers (Moran, 1992) and 
biological evidence that P. argus commonly 
undertake long-distance migrations (Herrnkind, 
1980) suggest that lobsters are migrating from 
shallow to deeper waters as they grow older and 
larger.  It appears, however, that they are being 
intercepted prior to reaching the refuge of deeper 
water. An effective strategy for lobster 
conservation in the TCI would involve a large 
protected area (Childress, 1997) in the core of the 
Caicos Bank to protect juveniles and their 
migration routes from shallow to deep habitats. 
However, it is unlikely that such a plan could be 
implemented, as it would be even more difficult 
to enforce remote MPA boundaries than size 
limits. We see more effective enforcement of 
current size limits as the solution to lobster 
overfishing; this would allow substantial numbers 
of adults to reach the refuge of deep waters and 
grow to reproductive size.  
 
Queen Conch 
The queen conch is a large marine gastropod 
found throughout most of the Caribbean, 
southern Florida, and Bermuda (Brownell and 
Stevely, 1981). Because queen conch are slow 
moving and inhabit shallow water, they are 
relatively easy to collect and have thus been a 
staple food item throughout the Caribbean for 
hundreds of years (Brownell and Stevely, 1981; 
Stager and Chen, 1996). Fueled by increases in 
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demand, commercial fisheries developed in many 
regions during the early- to mid-1900’s (Ninnes, 
1994). Consequently, fishing pressure on queen 
conch stocks quickly became intense, bringing 
some stocks, such as those off of Bermuda, to the 
point of commercial extinction (Brownell and 
Stevely, 1981; Mulliken 1996).  
In the TCI, commercial landings of queen conch 
have been recorded since 1904 (Ninnes, 1994). 
Although landings have been quite variable 
throughout the years, the size of landed conch has 
decreased over time and the need to harvest in 
more distant, deeper waters has increased, 
suggesting that stocks may be declining (Ninnes, 
1994). To address concerns regarding the possible 
decline of queen conch stocks in the TCI, fisheries 
legislation was enacted to help regulate harvest 
rates (Mulliken, 1996). To date, harvesting 
regulations include size limits, equipment 
restrictions, licensing and export quotas, and a 
seasonal closure of the fishery. In addition to 
these traditional fisheries management 
techniques, an MPA, EHLCR, was established off 
of South Caicos in 1993. 
As with any marine reserve, one of the anticipated 
benefits of the MPA was an increase in abundance 
of queen conch within the reserve (Bohnsack, 
1993; Murray et al., 1999). A recent study 
demonstrated that five years after its 
establishment, the density of queen conch within 
EHCLR was nearly double that in similar habitat 
outside the reserve (Tewfik and Bene, in press). 
The study also found that adults dominated the 
age/size structure of the queen conch population 
within the MPA, whereas juveniles dominated 
populations outside the reserve. This result is no 
doubt due to the limited harvesting within the 
reserve, which enables individuals to fully grow to 
the adult life stage (Stoner and Ray, 1996). 
Given the increase in density of queen conch 
inside the MPA, it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that spillover from the reserve might enhance 
local fishing yields (Bohnsack, 1993; Murray et 
al., 1999). However, preliminary results of spatial 
surveys conducted within and adjacent to the 
MPA suggest that the current reserve boundaries 
do not promote the spillover of adults into fished 
areas (Danylchuk, unpublished data). Extremely 
shallow sandbars run adjacent to two borders of 
the reserve and queen conch are rarely found in 
these areas. Since queen conch prefer moderately 
dense seagrass beds that provide food and shelter 
(Stoner and Waite, 1990), their near absence on 
these shallow, sandy areas is not surprising. 
Moreover, as queen conch grow they tend to 
expand their home ranges to include deeper 
waters (Hesse, 1979; Stoner and Ray, 1996), 
further reducing the likelihood of adults 
dispersing over shallow sandbars. Although 
deeper water does occur near the remaining 
border of EHLCR, this section of the reserve 
abuts ACLSNP and the offshore boundary rapidly 
exceeds the depth range for queen conch (Stoner 
and Sandt, 1992). 
Although the potential for spillover of adults from 
EHLCR into locally fished areas is limited, 
spawning activity within the reserve may help 
support local queen conch populations. Studies in 
the Bahamas indicate that the distribution of 
queen conch is directly related to larval supply, 
and high densities of late-stage larvae tend to be 
found in areas where stable aggregations of 
juvenile queen conch also occur (Stoner and 
Davis, 1997). Given that conch larvae have a 
relatively short planktonic stage and local 
oceanographic conditions can retain larvae 
between 10- and 100-km from where they were 
hatched (reviewed in Appledoorn, 1997), it is 
likely that larvae originating in the MPA supply 
other core conch nurseries downstream of the 
reserve.  
To realize the full potential of the EHLCR as a 
fishing reserve, it may be necessary to revisit the 
siting of the reserve boundaries. At present, the 
spillover of adults to fished areas is impeded by 
the lack of contiguous, suitable habitat, limiting 
the contribution of the MPA to the local fishery. 
As such, it may be worth examining whether the 
size of the reserve could be reduced to enhance 
the local harvest. However, further research is 
needed to determine whether changing the 
location of the boundaries will have any 
substantial effects on the breeding population and 
subsequent larval supply to fished areas 
downstream of the reserve.  
 
Reef Fishes 
Since fisheries are size-selective, the 
establishment of MPAs is expected to increase 
both the average size and abundance of exploited 
species. In general, MPAs have proven effective in 
this capacity, particularly with regard to large 
carnivorous species such as groupers (Serranidae) 
and snappers (Lutjanidae) which are long-lived, 
slow-growing fishes with delayed reproduction 
(Polunin and Roberts, 1993; Rakitin and Kramer, 
1996; Sluka et al., 1996, 1998; Johnson et al., 
1999; Tupper and Juanes, 1999). These families 
are among the most important both commercially 
and recreationally throughout subtropical and 
tropical waters (Sluka et al., 1996; Sluka and 
Sullivan, 1998; Beets and Friedlander, 1999). 
Since fecundity of fishes increases exponentially 
with length (Wootton, 1990), an increase in both 
average size and abundance of fish within MPAs 
should lead to substantially greater fish 
production than in adjacent fished areas (Plan 
Development Team, 1990; Roberts and Polunin, 
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1991). Theoretically, small MPAs could produce 
as many eggs as much larger fished areas (Man et 
al., 1995). Whether or not this production will 
enhance local fisheries depends on local 
oceanographic processes that transport larvae 
from protected spawning areas (Tupper and 
Juanes, 1999). 
In order to be effective, MPAs must be planned 
with the ecology of target species in mind 
(Murray et al., 1999). In particular, MPAs must 
encompass the habitats used by a target species 
and must also encompass most of the species’ 
home range (Kramer and Chapman, 1999). The 
more time fish spend outside the MPA, the higher 
their risk of fishing mortality. Thus, MPAs are 
rarely effective in protecting highly migratory 
species. Some groupers, such as the gag, 
Mycteroperca microlepis, and the Nassau 
grouper, Epinephelus striatus, may migrate 
several hundred kilometers to spawning 
aggregation sites, during which time they are 
vulnerable to fishing (Tupper, 1999). These 
species may spend significant amounts of time 
outside of small MPAs, reducing the benefits of 
protection. 
Abundance and size of several commercially 
important reef fishes, including Nassau grouper, 
were measured within several habitat types in 
fished reefs and in a small MPA around South 
Caicos (Tupper, unpublished data). There was no 
difference between fished and unfished areas in 
mean size or density of any grouper species. It 
was determined that Nassau grouper preferred 
windward Pleistocene reef formations along the 
edge of the drop-off, at a depth of approximately 
20-m. These high-relief formations, which 
provide abundant caves and crevices in which 
groupers could shelter and ambush prey, were not 
present within the MPA. This suggests that 
habitat preference may be more important than 
fishing pressure in determining the distribution 
and abundance of Nassau grouper. In contrast, 
Sluka et al. (1996) found no significant 
relationship between habitat variables and the 
abundance of Nassau grouper. They also found 
that Nassau grouper, in addition to several other 
grouper species, were more abundant and larger 
within the Exumas Cays Land & Sea National 
Park (central Bahamas) than on adjacent 
unprotected reefs. However, The Exuma Cays do 
not possess the same type of high-relief windward 
reefs nor the steep drop-off that typifies the TCI 
shelf edge (M. Tupper, personal observation). 
Several studies have shown an association 
between groupers and high-relief habitats 
(Nagelkerken, 1981; Sluka, 1995; Sluka et al., 
1996, 1998). It is likely that in the absence of 
preferred habitat types, fishing pressure would 
become the major factor influencing distribution 
and abundance of exploited reef fishes.  
Another possible explanation for the differing 
results of protection in the Exuma Cays and TCI 
is that fishing pressure on Nassau grouper and 
other reef fishes is probably higher in the Exuma 
Cays. In the TCI, the fishery is directed mainly at 
queen conch and spiny lobster; finfish are most 
often taken opportunistically as bycatch of the 
lobster fishery (Kassakian, 1999). In order to see 
any effects of establishing an MPA, the area must 
be subject to a lower level of fishing pressure than 
surrounding areas. It is possible that the level of 
fishing pressure around South Caicos is too low to 
cause a detectable difference in fish size and 
abundance between the MPA and surrounding 
areas.  
 
Table 2: Density (number of individuals per 100 m2) 
of grouper species in protected and fished areas of the 
wider Caribbean region1.  
 
1 Sample areas are arranged from heavily fished (left) 
to no fishing (right). BMR = Barbados Marine 
Reserve; ECLSP = Exuma Cays Land & Sea Park; 
ACLSNP = Admiral Cockburn Land & Sea National 
Park. Table modified from Chiappone et al. (2000). 
Barbados data from Chapman and Kramer (1999). 
South Caicos data from Tupper (unpublished). 
Grouper Species Barbados
SE
Cuba
Dominican
Republic
Florida
Keys S Exumas N Exumas S Caicos BMR ECLSP ACLSNP
Cephalopholis cruentatus 0.08 2.30 0.95 0.97 0.16 0.60 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.15
C. fulva 0.16 0.63 0.35 0.01 1.30 0.44 1.86 0.24 0.52 1.78
Epinephelus adcensionis 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.08
E. guttatus 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.14 0.20
E. itajara 0.02
E. striatus 0.01 0.16 0.20 0.62 0.35 0.48
Mycteroperca bonaci 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
M. tigris 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.16
M. venenosa 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.05
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Indeed, Table 2 shows that the density of all 
species measured at South Caicos rivaled or 
exceeded densities reported for these species 
within MPAs elsewhere in the Caribbean 
(Chapman and Kramer, 1999; Chiappone et al., 
2000). Thus, the ACLSNP may not be effective in 
protecting reef fish stocks around South Caicos 
simply because they are not currently in need of 
protection. However, the fishery situation in the 
Turks & Caicos Islands is rapidly changing. 
Increasing demand for finfish from the hotel and 
restaurant industries has rapidly increased the 
demand for grouper and snapper on the more 
developed islands of Grand Turk and 
Providenciales (Christian-Smith and Darian, 
2000). The South Caicos MPA may therefore 
prove useful in the future, particularly if its 
boundaries are extended to include the preferred 
habitat of Nassau grouper. 
 
Potential Economic Value of TCI MPAs  
 
Economic Theory 
To implement MPAs in developing countries will 
usually require more than simply providing 
evidence of their ecological value. Ecological 
arguments may hold little weight if there are not 
economic benefits associated with MPAs. If the 
economic benefits of marine conservation can be 
tied to the health of economically important 
industries (i.e., tourism), then MPAs may be 
considered a realistic management option. A 
critical step in MPA implementation is to 
demonstrate the linkages between ecological 
health and economic opportunity. 
 
Public environmental goods such as 
environmental quality are those that have no 
market impacts and are therefore impossible to 
value using standard economic techniques (Boyle 
and Bishop, 1987). Concentrating on direct use  
value (i.e., the value of enhanced fishery 
production for consumptive uses) and ignoring 
nonmarket values can lead to the 
underestimation of the economic benefits of 
conservation, a bias in the decision-making 
process, reduced social welfare and a 
misallocation of societal resources (Randall, 
1993). A total economic value (TEV) framework 
based on Dixon and Pagiola (1998) is useful for 
considering the potential economic value of the 
diverse ecological services that MPAs are thought 
to provide. The main focus in valuation will vary 
for different MPA ecological services; the primary 
types of economic value that the various services 
are likely to provide are highlighted in Figure 2. 
A number of methodologies have been used for 
assessing the value of ecological goods and 
services. These include Travel Cost Methodology 
(TCM) (Fletcher et al., 1990), Contingent 
Valuation Methodology (CVM) (Hannemann, 
1984) and, most recently, a number of techniques 
adapted from marketing research and broadly 
known as conjoint analysis (Johnson et al., 1995; 
Roe et al., 1996; Hanley et al., 1998; Farber and 
Griner, 2000). These methodologies can be 
divided into two general categories: those that 
rely on revealed preferences and those that rely 
on stated preferences. TCM is a revealed 
preference method because it uses real 
expenditures that people make on recreational 
travel to statistically analyze willingness to pay 
(WTP) for environmental quality. CVM and 
conjoint surveys, on the other hand, are 
methodologies that rely on stated preferences. In 
these surveys, people are queried about their 
preferences in surveys that present hypothetical 
market situations. These surveys allow the 
derivation of values for goods and services that 
would otherwise have to be excluded from cost-
benefit analyses. 
 
 
Indirect Option Existence Bequest
Potential Ecological Benefits Consumptive Non-Consumptive
  Increased Abundance ?
  Increased Size ?
  Spillover to Fishing Grounds ?
  Larval Export ?
  Increased Ecosystem Resilience ? ?
  Maintain Biodiversity ? ?
Total Economic Value
Use Value Non-Use Value
Direct
 
Figure 2: Total Economic Value Framework and Areas of Focus for MPA Valuation 
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There has been an increasing amount of 
environmental research using conjoint 
methodologies developed in other fields of 
economics (Louviere, 1988; Carson et al., 1994). 
These include choice experiments (Roe et al., 
1996; Hanley et al., 1998; Farber and Griner, 
2000; Huybers and Bennett, 2000) and paired 
comparison conjoint analysis (Johnson et al., 
1995; Johnson et al., 1998). The strength of 
conjoint approaches derives from the use of 
nearly orthogonal survey designs that statistically 
isolate the effects of individual attributes on 
choice (Hanley et al., 1998). In a paired 
comparison conjoint analysis, survey respondents 
are presented with a choice of product profiles, 
each of which consists of a number of attributes. 
Each attribute can take on a number of specific 
levels that influence the value consumers perceive 
for the product. Whereas CVM asks respondents 
whether they are willing to pay a fee to improve 
environmental quality, a paired-comparison 
conjoint survey asks respondents to provide a 
rated comparison of two different profiles. We 
ask: what is your preference, on a scale of 1 to 9, 
of the baseline profile compared to an alternative 
profile? 
While beyond the scope of the current paper, it is 
possible to derive measures of consumer welfare 
that are comparable with those derived using 
CVM using re-scaling of the ratings, a probit 
model and maximum-likelihood estimation 
techniques (Johnson et al., 1998). For current 
purposes, we concentrate on demonstrating the 
added value that increased environmental quality 
can provide to divers. This can be done assuming 
a simple linear utility function and using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) to estimate regression 
coefficients that can then be used in market 
simulations. While theoretically correct estimates 
of consumer welfare are important for 
comprehensive cost-benefit analyses and possibly 
for setting park entrance fees, the demonstration 
of the economic potential of MPA protection is in 
itself a strong educational tool for government 
decision-makers in developing countries. 
 
 
Survey Methodology: Diver Preferences 
for Nassau Grouper 
The focal species for our study was Nassau 
grouper because it is thought to have both 
consumptive and non-consumptive use values for 
the restaurant and dive industries, respectively. 
The goals of this survey are to: (1) identify key 
environmental attributes that add value to the 
experience of TCI dive tourists; and (2) assess the 
price sensitivity of divers to changing levels of 
these key attributes.  
Key attributes were identified through interviews 
with dive tour operators, and experienced sport 
and professional divers in the TCI. Appropriate 
levels were chosen based on expert judgement, 
survey pre-testing and a pilot survey. Revisions to 
the pilot survey were incorporated to a second 
draft survey and further feedback obtained from 
survey respondents and dive operators. The final 
survey instrument used a total of five attributes 
and a total of twenty levels: size of dive group (3-
7, 8-14, 15-23, and 24-30); presence of other 
species (1 or more lobster, 1 or more sea turtles, 1 
or more reef shark, and none of the above); 
Nassau grouper abundance (1, 3, 6, or 12 fish per 
dive); Nassau grouper average size (small 2.27-kg, 
medium 6.80-kg, and large 13.61 kg); and dive 
price ($40, $41, $45, $50 or $60 per 20-minute 
single tank dive). 
The four sizes of dive group span the most 
common range for dive charters in the TCI. We 
found through initial interviews that seeing “big 
stuff” was very important to divers and that 
sharks, turtles, dolphins, eagle rays and whales 
are some of the charismatic megafauna divers 
most commonly expressed interest in seeing. We 
included an ‘other animal’ attribute in the survey, 
which included reef shark, sea turtle and spiny 
lobster. Aggregations of lobster are known to 
attract sport divers in New Zealand (Kelly et al., 
2000b), however the potential recreational value 
of lobsters had not previously been considered in 
a Caribbean context before and was therefore of 
substantial interest. 
The conjoint survey questions were designed 
using Sawtooth Software’s Conjoint Value 
Analysis (CVA) software package (Sawtooth 
Software, 1996). An optimally efficient paired 
comparison survey would be both orthogonal 
(i.e., attributes vary completely independently) 
and balanced (i.e., each attribute is shown an 
equal number of times). This survey used five 
attributes with a total of twenty levels, yielding a 
potential design space of over 917,000 possible 
paired comparisons. Because paired comparison 
surveys are cognitively challenging and can lead 
to respondent exhaustion (Huber, 1997), it is 
important to limit the number of questions in a 
survey. In this survey, we limited the number of 
questions to eighteen. 
The CVA experimental design module identifies 
promising experimental designs by examining a 
pool of potential CVA questions selected 
randomly from the design space. D-efficiency 
(Kuhfeld et al., 1994), a measure of the goodness 
of a specific experimental design relative to the 
ideal orthogonal balanced design, is calculated for 
a pool of questions five times larger than the 
desired survey size. Paired comparisons that 
contribute little to the overall statistical efficiency 
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are eliminated one by one until an 18-question 
survey design was obtained. This procedure was 
replicated twenty times and the survey design 
with the highest D-efficiency was retained and 
used in the final survey instrument. A sample 
question is shown in Figure 3: for most people, 
Option 1 was strongly preferred to Option 2 
because it was a dive with a smaller dive group, 
reef sharks were present, and there were more 
and larger grouper for only $5 more per dive. 
 
Category Option A Option B 
Size of the Dive Group 15-23 Divers per Group 24-30 Divers per Group 
Presence of Other Animals 1 or more Reef Sharks No turtle, shark, lobster 
Grouper Abundance 6 Groupers per Dive 3 Groupers per Dive 
Average Grouper Size Large Grouper: 30-lbs Medium Grouper Size: 15-lbs 
Price of the Dive $45 per Single Tank Dive $ 40 per Single Tank Dive 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
A is 
much 
better 
 A is 
somewhat 
better 
 A & B are 
about 
equal 
 B is 
somewhat
better 
 B is 
much 
better 
Please circle a number from 1 to 9 that reflects your rating 
 
Figure 3: Paired Comparison Survey Question 
 
A dummy variable OLS regression technique was 
used to estimate conjoint utilities as a function of 
the independent variables dive group size, 
presence of other animals, the abundance and 
average size of Nassau grouper, and the price of 
the dive. Based on expert opinion and pilot survey 
feedback, increasing grouper size and abundance 
were assumed to provide increasing utility while 
increasing dive price and group size were 
assumed to lead to a reduction in respondent 
utility. No a priori relationship was assumed for 
the presence of other animals. 
The regression coefficients – known in marketing 
literature as part-worth’s – were calculated and 
used in the CVA market simulator. Total utility 
for each of a variety of hypothetical dive profiles 
being simulated were calculated for each survey 
respondent. The product with the highest overall 
utility for each respondent is assigned a score of 
‘1’, while all other profiles are given a score of ‘0’. 
The market simulator averages the ‘first choice’ 
preference scores across all respondents and 
calculates percent market share for each 
hypothetical dive profile in a particular 
simulation. 
The final paired comparison questions, along with 
questions about environmental attitudes, MPA 
knowledge, and demographics were distributed to 
visiting divers in the TCI via commercial dive 
operators and to student and non-student visitors 
at the Center for Marine Resource Studies. A total 
of 80 usable survey responses were used in this 
analysis; this represents an overall response rate 
of approximately 30%.     
 
Survey Results 
Female respondents accounted for 56% of the 80 
usable survey responses. 65% of the respondents 
were under 30 years of age and 73% of 
respondents were American citizens. 94% of 
respondents had at least some college education 
and 33% had household incomes over US 
$125,000. This was the first visit to the TCI for 
79% of respondents. The most important factors 
influencing the dive profile choice according to 
respondents was dive group size (46%) and 
overall species diversity (36%); only 9% of 
respondents stated that dive price was the most 
important factor in their comparison tasks. 
Individual utility regressions were conducted on 
the 80 individual survey responses. The overall fit 
of the regressions was high, with an average R2 of 
0.97. This is indicative of a high level of internal 
self-consistency in decision making for 
respondents. 
The regression coefficients were then used to 
calculate utility for various scenarios and 
calculate market shares for competing dive 
profiles. Consider first a baseline scenario in 
which a survey respondent faced four alternative 
dive package profiles for their next SCUBA dive. 
They can choose between: (1) a dive with a very 
large group of 24 – 30 divers for the most 
economical price of $40; (2) a dive with a slightly 
smaller group of 15 – 23 divers for a slightly 
higher fee of $45; (3) a dive with a medium size 
group of 8 – 14 divers for $50; or (4) a dive with a 
small group of 3 – 7 divers for the most expensive 
price of $60. For all cases, assume that the 
environmental conditions are the same: the diver 
sees one small 2.3-kg (5-lb) grouper and no other 
animals (lobster, shark, sea turtle) during a 20-
minute dive. Given the stated preferences of the 
current sample respondents, about 31% of these 
divers would choose the smallest and most 
expensive $60 dive profile. Another 34% would 
choose the medium size group for $50, while the 
remainder of respondents would choose one of 
the more economical, larger dive groups. 
Now consider alternative dive profiles in which 
the abundance of Nassau grouper increases 
compared to the baseline scenario. This could be 
due to the effects of an MPA or because dive 
operators take their clients to more remote and 
pristine dive sites. From a theoretical perspective, 
variations in travel costs to a particular site are 
economically equivalent to a per trip entrance fee 
to the same location (Cameron, 1992). When we 
simulate an increase in grouper abundance for 
the most expensive $60 dive profile while holding 
grouper abundance in other dive profiles 
constant, we observe an increasing market share 
for the expensive dive with each increase in 
Nassau grouper abundance (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Small Group Dive Profile (p=$60) Market 
Share for Varying Levels of Grouper Abundance 
 
An increase in abundance from one to twelve 
Nassau grouper per dive results in market share 
for the small, expensive dive profile rising from 
31% to 78%. Increasing grouper abundance adds 
value to the dive experience. Dive operators could 
charge higher prices and increase revenue by 
taking clients to sites with higher grouper 
abundance. Alternatively, MPA entrance fees 
could be used to capture consumer surplus 
resulting from increased grouper abundance. An 
increase of $5 per dive, for instance, would have 
little impact on the number of dives if there were 
abundant Nassau grouper at a protected dive site. 
Note that we observe increasing market share but 
a flattening in the curve from six to twelve Nassau 
grouper per dive. This is indicative of decreasing 
average marginal utility for increasing grouper 
abundance. 
Turning to Nassau grouper size, we observe an 
almost linear increase in market share for the 
expensive dive profile as average fish size 
increases from 2.3-kg (5-lbs) to 13.6-kg (30-lbs) 
average weight (Figure 5). Unlike the case for 
Nassau grouper abundance, there is no indication 
of diminishing marginal returns to size. 
 
Figure 5: Small Group Dive Profile (p=$60) Market 
Share for Varying Levels of Grouper Size 
 
The simulations in which the various other 
animals increased in abundance demonstrated 
that all the other reef species – spiny lobster, sea 
turtles and reef sharks – added value to the dive 
experience of TCI divers. As Figure 6 illustrates, 
the presence of one or more spiny lobsters 
increased the small group market share from 31% 
to 61% in this simulation. Market share for small 
group dive profiles increased even more, to 85%, 
with sea turtles and reef sharks. 
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Figure 6: Small Group Dive Profile (p=$60) Market 
Share for Varying Levels of the Presence of Other 
Animals  
 
Finally, we simulated the effect of price increases 
on market share for the small group profile in the 
absence of any other animals and with a baseline 
of 1-small 2.3-kg grouper. As the price of the 
small group dive profile increased from $40 to 
$60, there was a sharp decline in market share 
for the small group, from 91.3% (s.e. = 3.16) at 
$45 per dive, to 71.3% (s.e. = 5.06) at $50 per 
dive, to 31.3% (s.e. = 5.18) at $60 per dive. This 
high degree of price sensitivity in the absence of 
increasing environmental quality is in line with 
anecdotal information about dive clients from 
dive operators and is indicative of the price 
competitiveness of the dive industry in the TCI. 
We can also analyze specific demographic groups 
using the Sawtooth market simulator. In this 
analysis, we conducted three market 
segmentation simulations: one of female versus 
male; one of divers under the age of 30 versus 
those 30 or older; and one of divers with basic 
SCUBA certification (resort or open water diver) 
versus those with advanced certifications 
(advanced open water or above). 
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We found no significant differences in market 
shares for divers with varying certification. Our 
results showed that there was a significant 
difference between male and female divers with 
regards to the price of the small group dive: when 
the price of the small group dive was $45, the 
small group market share for females was 86.7% 
Nassau Grouper Size Nassa  r er Size 
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versus 97.1% for males (t=1.80). The difference in 
market shares for genders were not significant at 
higher prices for the small group dive.  
When examining younger versus older divers, we 
found a significant difference in market share for 
the small group dive. Only 19.2% of the divers 
under 30 years of age chose the most expensive 
dive profile, compared to 53.6% of the older 
divers (t=3.15). In the absence of any special dive 
features, the older group was less price sensitive 
than the younger divers. In addition, there were 
significant differences between younger and older 
divers for all levels of grouper size (Figure 7). 
Increasing grouper size, however, added 
proportionally more value to the dive experience 
for the younger divers. 
 
Figure 7: Grouper Size Influence on Small Group Dive 
Profile (p=$60) Market Share by Demographic 
Segment 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Lesson 1. Ecological Effectiveness of MPAs 
An important lesson emerges from the South 
Caicos research – there can be no economic 
benefits of MPAs if MPAs are ecologically 
ineffective. This should be a straightforward 
truism but, unfortunately, MPA design is often 
guided by principles of geographic convenience or 
does not fully consider the complex organisms 
and ecological systems that MPAs are designed to 
protect. In South Caicos, we currently find little 
solid evidence of the ecological effectiveness of 
current MPAs due to the arbitrary design of the 
reserves.  
In the case of spiny lobster, we believe that MPAs 
are likely to be an ineffective management option 
for the TCI. The long larval period of the spiny 
lobster (Lipcius and Cobb, 1994) makes it 
relatively unlikely that the Caicos Bank lobster 
population is self-recruiting. There are also 
complications in linking spawning and 
recruitment because of the myriad environmental 
factors that affect larval transport, settlement, 
and juvenile recruitment (Childress, 1997). If 
recruitment results from spawning in other areas 
of the Caribbean, there is little incentive for local 
fishers to invest in local conservation efforts. The 
participation of fishers in conservation efforts 
requires that they feel dependent on the resource 
and that they have the capacity to impact the state 
of the system (Mascia, 2000). In South Caicos, 
the first condition holds but, due to biological and 
institutional factors, the fishers do not seem to 
feel that their actions might help conserve the 
lobster stocks (Olguin et al., 1998). The solution 
for lobster conservation is likely to lie in more 
effective enforcement of existing size regulations 
rather than MPA expansion and, at a regional 
level, research and negotiations that implement 
policy at a scale appropriate to take into account 
the cross-border transport of spiny lobster larvae.  
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For queen conch, MPAs are much more likely to 
be effective fisheries management tools in the 
TCI. Conch have a short larval period (Appeldorn, 
1997), so the Caicos Bank population is almost 
certainly self-recruiting. We suspect that queen 
conch disperse from core nursery grounds to 
deeper habitat dominated by seagrass as they 
grow older. If correct, this means that there 
should be good potential for designing MPAs that 
protect core nursery grounds and adjacent adult 
habitat, producing commercially valuable 
spillover to areas outside of reserves. When the 
link between the protection of nursery grounds 
and spillover benefits to the local fishery can be 
demonstrated, it is much more likely that fishers 
will actively support MPAs because it will be in 
their economic interest. 
Nassau G roup er S ize Nas au Gro  
 The ecological effectiveness of MPAs for local 
reef finfish is also uncertain. While evidence does 
suggest that size and abundance of key reef 
species does increase in MPAs (Murray et al., 
1999), the effects of any particular MPA are 
highly dependent on site specific factors (Kramer 
and Chapman, 1999; Tupper and Juanes, 1999). 
Like lobster, marine fish species of commercial 
interest tend to have long larval phases and it is 
difficult to link larval output to juvenile 
recruitment. Nassau grouper do migrate from 
their home range to spawning sites and hence 
may spillover, for better or worse, to commercial 
fishing grounds along the migration path.  
One issue that is clear in the TCI is the lack of 
protection for important spawning aggregations 
and migration corridors. Aggregations are highly 
vulnerable to fishing pressure (Russ and Alcala, 
1989; Russ, 1991; Sluka et al., 1996; Sluka and 
Sullivan, 1997) and need protection to ensure the 
maintenance of long-term reproductive capacity. 
The larval output from aggregations may be 
valuable at both local and regional levels. MPAs 
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and/or seasonal closures are thus likely to play an 
important role in the conservation of the stocks of 
important reef species like groupers, both in the 
TCI and beyond. For finfish, like queen conch, 
boundary changes to existing MPAs will be 
necessary to promote conservation and fishery 
production benefits. The exact nature of the 
boundary changes remains under investigation. 
 
Lesson 2. Economic Analysis – Start with 
the Obvious. 
A second lesson that arises from the TCI research 
is to start economic valuation with the obvious. 
We have seen that quantifying the ecological 
effects, and hence the consumptive use value, of 
MPAs is difficult for the tropical inshore 
environment. It is relatively easier, however, to 
assess any increase in size and abundance of 
animals within an MPA. In a country like the TCI, 
where tourism is the most important part of the 
economy, it makes logistical and economic sense 
to start valuation efforts by focusing on the non-
consumptive use value that tourists hold for the 
natural environment. 
Recreational activities such as snorkeling and 
SCUBA diving are amenable to a variety of 
valuation methodologies. An important aspect of 
tourism valuation is that it concentrates on 
localized spatial and temporal effects. The 
impacts of increased environmental quality on 
the reefs are of immediate economic value for 
snorkelers and SCUBA divers. Divers are also 
already paying for their experience, so the 
marginal value of increasing environmental 
quality has the very real potential of generating 
more revenue for dive operators or for 
government. Contrast this with the case of 
existence value: while people from around the 
world may hold some intrinsic value for knowing 
that TCI coral reef organisms are protected, the 
actual mechanism for transferring the consumer 
surplus from the beneficiary of conservation 
efforts (i.e., people around the world) to those 
that bear the costs of conservation (i.e., TCI 
residents, fishers, and dive operators) is highly 
problematic. The ability to relate costs and 
benefits at local scale is one of the key 
characteristics of successful renewable resource 
management institutions (Ostrom, 1990; Gibson 
et al., 2000).  
 
Lesson 3. Non-Consumptive Use Value can 
be Significant. 
Finally, we have learned from our analysis that 
the non-consumptive use value that divers hold 
for increased grouper size and abundance, and for 
the increased presence of other key reef species, is 
potentially large. 
Increasing Nassau grouper abundance and mean 
size had positive effects on market share for the 
expensive dive group in the simulations. In the 
case of abundance, the net revenue increase was 
13.0% for increasing from one to twelve grouper 
per dive (i.e., the difference in total value between 
the baseline and target scenarios, sipi, for 
market share si and dive price pi, i=1-5 dive group 
size options). Similarly, the increase in net 
revenue as a result of an increase from small to 
large Nassau grouper was 5.6%. Simulations 
showed diminishing marginal utility for increases 
in grouper abundance but we did observe a near 
linear increase in market share with increasing 
grouper size. Based on conversations with dive 
operators, it appears that divers may be 
correlating grouper size and overall dive quality 
as the rarer, large Nassau grouper are indicative 
of unfished (Sluka et al., 1998) and therefore 
superior dive sites  
Both reef shark and sea turtles had a large impact 
on market share in the simulations. This is not 
unexpected, as both groups of animals are among 
the most popular with dive tourists. The strong 
impact of lobster on market share, on the other 
hand, was unexpected. While it is known that 
spiny lobster aggregations are an attraction for 
divers in New Zealand (Kelly et al., 2000b). Our 
general view in the TCI had been that lobsters 
were of value only for consumptive use. While our 
results are preliminary, they are the first of which 
we are aware that indicate Caribbean spiny 
lobsters may have a quantifiable non-
consumptive value for tourists.  
Our survey showed that divers are relatively price 
insensitive when animal abundance was high but 
that there was strong resistance to higher prices 
for dives that differed only by group size. This is 
consistent with the experience of dive operators 
in the TCI; they were very cognizant of the 
importance of dive price as a factor in client 
decision making. Dive operators fully realize that 
maintaining reef quality – coral diversity and fish 
abundance – is crucial to the success of their 
businesses. At the same time, however, they 
tended to be very wary of any increases in dive 
price that might be caused by MPA user fees. 
Their caution stems from a wariness of the 
government’s ability to actually transform MPA 
revenue into concrete actions to protect the reefs. 
Government, on the other hand, has a mandate to 
manage public goods for the citizens of the TCI. 
As with all public goods, there are incentives for 
users to free-ride on the contributions of others 
and a tendency for society to under-produce 
public goods as a result (Ostrom, 1990). The 
emerging NPS is now funded by a 1% value-added 
tax on hotel accommodation and meals. Revenue 
for 2000 is projected at approximately $550,000, 
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but this amount is unlikely to finance the 
management of all TCI MPAs (F. Homer, 
personal communication). Our study suggests 
divers hold significant untapped non-
consumptive use value for environmental quality 
that might be used to increase production of the 
public goods – ecological services – provided by 
MPAs. 
The policy challenge in the TCI is to balance the 
needs of rural fishers and the growing dive-
tourism industry while tapping the typically 
unrealized and remarkable WTP for nature-based 
tourism (Gössling, 1999). Conservation of Nassau 
grouper and other key finfish species could result 
in a loss of revenue for artisanal fishers in the 
TCI. However, in the TCI a $5 increase in the 
price of a dive might lead to revenue of up to 
$750,000. Thus, the income generated through 
premium pricing for access to MPA dive sites 
might be sufficient to compensate fishers for 
losses of fishing opportunities due to MPA 
implementation as well as cover the marginal 
costs of expanded park operations necessary for 
the protection for the ecological services crucial to 
the competitiveness of the dive industry.  
What do we yet need to fill in the balance of the 
ecological and economic puzzle? This survey does 
not provide a quantitative estimate of consumer 
surplus, but is a first step in that direction and 
has already yielded results that lend support for 
the view that ecologically effective MPAs are 
economically valuable. The logical follow-up is to 
develop an expanded study that is distributed to a 
wider audience, possibly via an exit survey at the 
national airport. The goal of this survey would be 
to quantify WTP of tourists for specific marine 
attributes important to their TCI experience. A 
broader pre-trip survey (e.g., Huybers and 
Bennett, 2000) would also be very useful in 
assessing how environmental quality enters into 
the decision of divers to travel to the TCI and if 
business and government support for MPAs have 
value as a signal to environmentally conscious 
consumers interested in high-quality dive 
experiences.  
Finally, it is clear that an increased effort must be 
directed to understanding the ecological systems 
that MPAs are meant to protect in the TCI. 
Understanding these systems may allow the 
economic valuation of increased fishery 
production and ecological resilience. While a full 
economic calculus may not be necessary to justify 
protection – there are indications non-
consumptive use values alone may be adequate 
justification for MPAs in the TCI – quantifying 
these values can only strengthen the case for the 
development of ecologically functional marine 
parks and fishing reserves in the TCI. 
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Abstract 
We utilize a spatial bioeconomic model to 
investigate the impacts of creating reserves on 
limited entry fisheries. We find that reserve 
creation can produce win-win situations where 
aggregate biomass and the common license 
(lease) price increase. These situations arise in 
biological systems where dispersal processes are 
prevalent and the fishery prior to reserve creation 
is operating at effort levels in a neighborhood of 
open-access levels. We also illustrate that using 
strictly biological criteria for siting reserves (e.g., 
setting aside the most biological productive areas) 
will likely induce the most vociferous objections 
from the fishing industry. In general, we find that 
the dispersal rate and the degree the patches are 
connected play a significant role on the net 
impacts on the fishing sector.  
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Introduction 
In June 2000, U.S. President Clinton signed an 
Executive Order directing agencies responsible 
for marine conservation to develop a plan to 
establish a comprehensive system of marine 
reserves within U.S. coastal waters. This was 
rightly hailed as a major victory by marine 
conservationists and scientists who have been 
vocal supporters of marine reserves for close to a 
decade. To long-time observers of the politics of 
fisheries management in the U.S., this action by 
the President is viewed by many as miraculous in 
a system more typically regarded as sluggish, 
provincial, and not prone to radical change. In 
many ways, the very rapid acceptance of the 
concept of marine reserves in U.S. policy is more 
reminiscent of radical executive order 
innovations in Canada thirty years ago 
establishing limited entry for the first time, and in 
New Zealand twenty years ago establishing 
individual transferable quota programs. 
Despite the fanfare, it would be 
premature for proponents of reserves to declare 
victory before the details are worked out. With 
marine reserves, the devil will certainly be in the 
details, and whether the U.S. ends up with 
anything close to what is envisioned by marine 
conservationists will certainly depend upon a 
lengthy process of debate over different design 
options, scales, and visions. And this debate will 
reflect strengths of opinions among different 
stakeholder groups: from scientists, to 
representatives of the conservation community, 
to fishermen and others who depend upon 
current configurations of regulations for their 
livelihoods. Fishermen will clearly play an 
important role in the political process, since the 
costs and benefits to them are much more 
tangible than the equally important but less easily 
quantifiable conservation benefits held by the 
public at large. 
This paper examines the question: how 
will various marine reserve options affect 
fishermen participating in limited entry fisheries? 
We ask the question from the fishermen’s 
perspective since we believe that the fishing 
industry will be the most likely and most effective 
opponent of reserves, if any group emerges to 
oppose them. In an open political system like that 
present in the U.S., the political process will 
eventually craft compromises and tradeoffs that 
reflect perceptions of gains and losses, and 
industry opposition will mobilize to block plans 
that might have large negative impacts on 
fishermen and coastal communities. 
Alternatively, the process will favor those plans 
that seem to involve “win-win” situations in 
which fishermen can gain from reserves, or 
situations in which reserve costs to the industry 
are relatively low.1  
We examine fisheries characterized by 
limited entry regulatory schemes for several 
reasons. First, most important fisheries in 
developed countries worldwide are either subject 
to some kind of limited entry program or are 
likely to have such programs in the near future. 
Second, we expand on some related work that 
addresses similar questions, but under the 
assumption of open-access institutions.2 Third, 
there are some interesting issues related to the 
manner in which license prices themselves are 
good signals about the overall economic health of 
the fishing industry, and hence good gauges of the 
economic impact of reserves. 
In the next section we develop a simple 
spatial bioeconomic model of a limited entry 
fishery harvesting a metapopulation. The model 
allows us to depict various behavioral 
characteristics of both the fishing industry and 
the population biology. The model is used to 
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simulate the introduction of a marine reserve in a 
patchy biological system. We focus on license 
prices and on aggregate industry rents to 
characterize the impacts of reserves. The last 
section summarizes and discusses further issues 
for investigation. 
 
The Model 
 
The foundations of the model employed here is 
developed in more detail in Sanchirico and Wilen 
[1999a, 2000]. The basic structure combines a 
standard biological metapopulation model with a 
reformulation of economic models developed by 
both H.S. Gordon [1954] and V. Smith [1968]. 
The complete integrated bioecono mic model can 
be written as: 
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 The first component is the biological 
system, which depicts the evolution of biomass 
levels in n separate biological patches where xi is 
the biomass level in patch i, fi(xi) is the per capita 
growth rate in patch i, hi is the harvest rate in patch 
i, dii is the rate of emigration from patch i (dii<0), 
and dij is the dispersal rate between patches i and j. 
The biological system depicted here is a standard 
linear metapopulation model in which there are n 
discrete patches in space, each of which is 
characterized by "own" patch dynamics as well as 
linkages to other patches.3 In this formulation, own 
growth is separable from dispersal, and the 
dispersal process can be flexibly modeled via 
appropriate choice of the coefficient dij.4 In this 
paper, we follow the long tradition in the ecology 
literature and depict the dispersal processes as 
density dependent.5 In density dependent dispersal 
processes, biomass flows between patches in a 
manner dependent upon the relative densities of 
each patch. The simplest representation of a 
density dependent dispersal process depicts the 
dispersal mechanism between patch one and two as 
d11x1+d12x2 ≡ b(x2/k2-x k1/ 1), and between patch two 
and one as d22x2+d21x1≡ b(x1/k1-x2/k2).  
  The second component is a behavioral 
model of a harvesting industry operating over a 
heterogeneous environment that depicts the fleet 
responding to economic variables over both time 
and space. Let Ei denote the patch-specific levels 
of effort in each patch i, and let Ri(Ei,xi) be 
corresponding rents (or profits) expected in patch 
i. Then we can hypothesize a simple sluggish 
adjustment process in which the level of effort, Ei 
in patch i, changes according to equation 2. In this 
specification, effort in patch i changes in response 
to the level of rents R(Ei, xi) vis a vis outside 
opportunities (captured in the first term), and net 
dispersal (depicted by the second term). The 
second term consists of a sum of pairwise spatial 
dispersal rates, each proportional to rent 
differentials across space between the patch in 
question and alternative patches. Hence there will 
be dispersal from patch j into patch i if rents in i 
exceed those in j, and dispersal to j from i if the net 
difference is negative. At any point in time, patch i 
may be contributing to a subset of patches 
experiencing higher relative rents and drawing 
from another subset experiencing relatively lower 
rents. For the system as a whole, these spatial 
forces tend to redistribute effort over space in a 
manner that, in the long run, equalizes net rents 
across all patches.6 
 The above system (equations 1 and 2) is 
capable of addressing a variety of questions about 
how fishing efforts will distribute itself over time 
and space, and how that distribution of absolute 
and relative effort will affect the biological system 
through own growth and dispersal. To close the 
model we need to specify the rent functions in ways 
that characterize institutional features of the 
fisheries that are of interest. In Sanchirico and 
Wilen [1999a] we assumed that the fishery is an 
open-access fishery in which effort flows into the 
fishery and across space in a way that ultimately 
dissipates rent in equilibrium. In particular, if we 
assume a Schaefer production function (hi=qiEixi, 
where qi is the catchability coefficient), constant 
patch-specific costs per unit effort (ci), and a 
common vessel capital opportunity cost (π), we 
have 
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as the aggregate rent function for patch i, where p is 
the ex-vessel price. With these patch-specific rent 
functions inserted into the system above, we can 
examine both transition paths and equilibria of 
various systems with different biological and 
economic characteristics.7  
  The spatial and intertemporal 
bioeconomic system outlined here is particularly 
useful for examining the impacts of reserve 
formation (Sanchirico and Wilen [2000]).8 If we 
begin, for example, with a system in which 
harvesters freely move across all patches in a 
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biological system, we can characterize the nature of 
the exploited equilibrium that would emerge, as 
well as the nature of the adjustment process to that 
exploited equilibrium. In this (pre-reserve) 
equilibrium, the level of own biological growth in 
each patch will be exactly offset by the total net 
dispersal between the patch and other linked 
patches, and the harvest in the patch in question. In 
addition, net rents will be identically equal to zero 
in each patch, leading to an economic equilibrium 
over time and space. The pre-reserve bioeconomic 
steady-state can be formally written as 
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Note that while the biological dispersal coefficients 
(dii and dij) affect the equilibrium vector of biomass 
and effort levels in each patch, the economic 
response parameters (si and sij) only affect the 
speed of response to equilibrium. This occurs 
because the economic system equilibrates when net 
rents in each patch are zero, and the conditions that 
generate zero rents are independent of the response 
rates, as in the Vernon Smith model of a single 
patch.  
 
 
Reserve Creation in a Limited Entry 
Fishery 
 
With straightforward modifications of the rent 
functions, the system discussed above can be used 
to depict a fishery that is regulated by a limited 
entry licensing system, with the licenses placed 
on vessels. The simplest way to see this is to note 
that the licensing system will create rights that 
have some value to existing and potential  
participants. In equilibrium, the price of licenses 
will rise until the opportunity cost is equal to the 
anticipated production rents in the fishery. Let  
be the equilibrium license lease price in a limited 
entry system, that is, the amount that a potential 
entrant would be willing to pay an existing 
participant to lease his/her vessel-specific license 
for a period. In equilibrium, we will have  
L
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across all patches, where the (common) license 
lease price is endogenously determined and is a 
function of the total number of licenses 
outstanding.9  
Thus, the license lease price rises to 
eliminate rents at two margins. The first margin 
is related to outside opportunities for the vessel 
capital in question. In equilibrium, owners of 
vessel capital will be indifferent between 
participating in the alternative fishery and 
earning per unit capital, or participating in the 
limited entry fishery by paying the lease price 
and earning  per vessel in the 
fishery. The second margin exists between any 
patch i and another alternative patch j. In the full 
spatial equilibrium, a vessel owner facing lease 
price will be indifferent between fishing in 
patch j and in patch i, so that 
.
π
c
L
pq
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To examine the implications of reserve 
creation within this system of limited entry 
licensing, we develop a simple three-patch 
exercise. In this exercise, we compare two 
systems, one without a reserve and one with a 
reserve located in patch three.11 Assuming that 
the own growth functions in each patch are 
quadratic, the system of equations that define the 
steady-state equilibrium for each of the two cases 
are in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Two Systems of Equations Defining the Steady-State Equilibrium 
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We use these systems to compute 
equilibrium values for biomass, harvest, effort in 
each patch and the (common) license price. 
Understanding the impacts of reserves on license 
prices is important, because license values are 
indicative of the total rents in the system. Any 
policy that increases aggregate rents in the 
industry will also increase license values; policies 
that decrease rents will decrease license values.  
In the remainder of this section, we 
discuss the impacts of reserve creation within 
closed, fully-integrated, and cascade systems (see 
Figure 1). As it turns out, we can analytically 
derive the results for the closed system. In the 
more complex and linked systems however, the 
systems of equations are non-linear. We 
numerically simulate the impacts of reserve 
creation in these cases.12  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Biological Systems* 
 
* The arrows represent the own and dispersal feedback 
mechanisms. 
 
 
Closed Biological System 
 As Sanchirico and Wilen [2000] have 
shown in the case of an open-access fishery, 
reserve creation in a closed metapopulation 
system increases aggregate biomass but fails to 
provide any benefits to the industry. In fact, due 
to the absence of spillover from the reserve, the 
reduction in harvest is greater than in the fully-
integrated and cascade systems. Intuitively, we 
would expect that in the limited entry setting, the 
open-access results would hold qualitatively, 
because there still is no mechanism for biological 
spillover effects. In fact they do. The steady-state 
levels for the closed case are provided in Table II. 
While this case is very restrictive, we find that it 
illustrates rather clearly the necessary 
mechanisms for the industry to benefit from 
closures.  
 
 We solve for the steady-state equilibrium 
levels of biomass, effort, and license price in this 
setting by using the fact that 
 and the 
steady state equations (equations 6 and 7). As is 
evident in Table II, the results illustrate not only 
the impact of a reserve, but also differences 
between equilibria in the open-access system and 
a limited-entry licensing system. Of course when 
the amount of effort limited in the fishery (E
( ) (i i i j j jpq x c L pq x cπ π− + = = − + )
TOT) 
is equal to the aggregate open-access levels, then 
the biomass and effort levels equal the open-
access levels. In this case, all rents are dissipated 
and the license value is zero. Thus, the open-
access aggregate effort level provides a natural 
upper bound to the total amount of effort. As the 
amount of total system effort is constrained to be 
smaller than the open-access equilibrium level, 
the “shadow price” on the constraint (the license 
value) rises. For any given amount of effort in the 
system, there will be a unique license value of L, 
and that value will be equal to the (common) rent 
level in all patches.  
 
 
 
Closed System 
 
 
 
Cascade System 
 
 
 
 
 
Fully-Integrated System 
 As it turns out, the implication of 
shutting down patch three in this setting is rather 
straightforward. The biomass density level there 
will equilibrate at its carrying capacity and the 
effort level will be zero. In the open patches, the 
more constrained the total effort, the higher the 
biomass and the system-wide license price, and 
the lower the patch-specific effort levels in 
remaining open areas. As discussed earlier, in a 
licensed limited-entry system, the license price 
provides a signal on the impact of policies on 
fishery rents. If the license price increases after 
patch three is closed, then fishery rents have 
increased due to the closure. Of course, if the 
license price decreases, then rents have 
decreased. 
 
3 
 
1 
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Table 2:  Equilibrium Levels with and without a reserve located in patch three 
EQUATION(8): WITHOUT A RESERVE EQUATION (9): WITH A RESERVE 
0
3
1
21
3
13
21
3
13
21
1 [ ]
1(1 [ ])
[ ] 
dij
OA OA TOT
i i iin i
i i
i
OA OA TOTi
i i ii
ii
i i
i
ss OA TOT
ii
i
i
i
x x E Erq
q
rE x E Erq q
q
pL E Er
q
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
= + -
= - - -
= -
å
å
å
å
å
å
 
0
2
12
21
2
12
21
2
12
21
1 [ ],  1, 2
,  3
1(1 [ ]),  1,2
0,  3
[ ] 
dij
OA OA TOT
i i ii
i
i i
i
k k
OA OA TOTi
i i ii
ii
i i
i
k
ss OA TOT
ii
i
i
i
x x E E irq
q
x K k
rE x E E irq q
q
E k
pL E Er
q
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
= + - =
= =
= - - - =
= =
= -
å
å
å
å
å
å
 
   (1 ) and xOA OAi ii i i
i i
c cwhere E r
pq pq
p p+ +
= - =  
 
 
We can illustrate these results either in 
terms of aggregate fishery rents or equilibrium 
license prices. The function depicting aggregate 
license values (equilibrium license price times the 
number of licenses outstanding) has a maximum 
at the total effort levels that maximize rents.13 In 
the pre-reserve system, for example, the optimal 
number of licenses is *
1
1
2
nTOT OA
ii
E E
=
= å .  
Post reserve creation, the optimal 
number of licenses decreases by 1/2*E3OA. In a 
biologically closed system, generally the post-
reserve license value function is everywhere lower 
than the pre-reserve function (see Figure 2 panel 
A), suggesting that reserves in a closed system do 
not improve economic conditions for fishermen. 
An implication of this is that the rent-maximizing 
level of effort after reserves are created is at a 
lower aggregate effort level, suggesting that a 
reserve policy designed to maximize industry 
rents may have to employ a buy-back or other 
effort-reducing scheme to eliminate excess effort. 
 
Linked Metapopulation Systems 
Upon reflection, it should not be 
surprising that creating a reserve in a complete 
decoupled system does not increase aggregate 
rents to fishermen. This is because there is no 
direct fisheries payoff to the closure in a 
biological system in which there is no dispersal. 
For fishermen to benefit from a closure, the 
closed patch must contribute some spillover of 
biomass to the remaining open patches, and that  
 
 
requires some dispersal. Accordingly, in this 
section, we simulate a closure in patch 3 but in 
fully-integrated and cascade systems in which 
there is density-dependent biological dispersal 
between the patches. In the cascade system, 
closing patch 3 corresponds to closing a patch on 
the edge of the system where the biomass only 
directly interacts with patch 2. Both of these 
biological structures illustrate circumstances that 
can lead to potential "win-win" scenarios.  
For the fully-integrated and cascade 
systems, we numerically simulate the derived 
demand for licenses and the maximum aggregate 
rent curves pre and post reserve creation. We 
continue to assume that the own growth functions 
in each patch are quadratic with equal intrinsic 
growth rates and carrying capacities (r=0.8, K=1), 
and with dispersal rates (b=0.4) equal to half the 
own growth rate. We initially introduce 
heterogeneity into the system by assuming that 
patch 3 is a relatively higher cost patch to fish 
than the other patches (c3=13.0 and c1=c2=11.0). 
The price is assumed identical across all patches 
(p=65) and catchability coefficients are 
normalized to 1.0. 
 The simulation finds values of effort and 
biomass across all patches that bring the system 
into a bioeconomic equilibrium, given some fixed 
amount of effort (ETOT). The results are presented 
in Figures 2 and 3. For comparison purposes, we 
simulate a reserve in the biologically closed case, 
which complements our earlier analytical results. 
For all cases, Figures 2 and 3 can be read as 
follows. Suppose that we have a limited entry 
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system with some reasonably restricted level of 
effort such as 1.08. Then, before a reserve is 
implemented in the biologically closed case 
(Panel A, Figures 2 and 3), license prices would 
have equilibrated at a level of 21.52 per unit of 
effort, and aggregate license values will be 23.31. 
After patch 3 is closed, license values per unit 
effort fall to 7.85, and aggregate license values 
(rent in the system) fall to 8.51. 
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Figure 2:  Derived demands for effort with and without a reserve in patch 3 
 
 
 
We first discuss the impacts of closing 
patch 3 within a fully-integrated system in 
which there is density-dependent biological 
dispersal between the patches. Panel B in Figures 
2 and 3 shows the impact of reserve creation in 
this kind of biological system. It is important to 
emphasize several important results, including 
some comparisons of the fully-integrated system 
with the closed case. First, the difference between 
system rents before and after the creation of a 
reserve is smaller than in the closed system. 
Second, over most of the range of total effort, a 
marine reserve costs the industry some rents. 
Thus while dispersal from the closed patch helps 
make up for the closure, on net the increase in 
yields after the closure is not sufficient to 
compensate for the lost opportunities in the 
closed patch. However, and interestingly, at high 
initial levels of effort, a reserve actually increases 
license values, suggesting possible “win-win” 
scenarios. This is consistent with Sanchirico and 
Wilen [2000] who show that “win-win” reserve 
designs are more probable when the closed patch 
is over-depleted, and when dispersal occurs after 
closure.  
 
 While the closed and fully-integrated 
cases define the bounds in terms of the degree of 
biological connectedness, the cascade system 
illustrates the impacts of siting reserves in 
intermediate cases. In addition, this case 
illustrates how the placement of a reserve can 
affect the overall outcome. Recall that in this case, 
patch three is only directly connected to patch 
two, which is the center patch. From panel C of 
Figure 2, it is evident that the range of effort 
levels corresponding to the "win-win" scenario is 
smaller than in the fully-integrated setting, 
everything else equal.  
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Figure 3:  Maximum Aggregate Rents with and without a Reserve 
 
 
Therefore, while locating a reserve on an 
edge of the system could yield positive economic 
and biological benefits, the magnitude of the 
benefits is less than what would arise when an 
area that is more connected to the rest of the 
system is set aside. This result stems from a 
spatial Le Chatelier effect, in which the cascade 
system is more constrained than the fully-
integrated system but less constrained than the 
closed system. As Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, the 
expected effects of reserves depend not only on 
the dispersal rate, as many have noted, but also 
on the ecological structure of the system where 
reserves are sited.   
 
Which Patch Should Be Closed? 
 It is clear that whether a reserve sited in a 
particular location or fishery will yield a win-win 
situation depends on the current biological and 
economic conditions. It is also clear that 
opposition to reserves by fishermen will be 
greatest in cases where they have the most to lose. 
Given the political-economy realities of siting 
reserves, a worthwhile exercise is to try to 
determine characteristics of patches where 
reserves are most likely to have the least 
objection.  
 In this section, we illustrate the impacts 
of siting reserves when there exists a patch that is 
more biologically productive and when there 
exists a lower cost patch. We focus on these two 
cases for a couple of reasons. First, many 
proponents of reserves treat the reserve selection 
issue as if it were one of simply finding and 
closing inherently high productivity areas. If this 
was the case, then we would expect that closing 
high productivity areas will yield a "win-win" 
scenario, or at least dominate (higher license 
prices) closing lower productivity areas, 
everything else equal. Second, under open-access 
conditions, Sanchirico and Wilen [2000] found 
that closing the most profitable patch provided 
the greatest chance for aggregate harvests to 
increase. This result was due to the fact that 
under open-access, the most profitable area is 
over-exploited (lower harvests) and shutting it 
down results in the lowest opportunity cost. In a 
limited-entry setting however, both the amount 
harvested and the net returns per unit of harvest 
in the fishery determine whether aggregate 
license prices might increase.  
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 To investigate the impacts of closing high 
productivity areas and low cost areas, we simulate 
the closure of patch 3 in a fully-integrated system, 
but with a new assumption that the patch has a 
growth rate or cost 1.5 times greater than patches 
1 and 2. We then compare the results to a closure 
in patch 2, which is assumed to have a lower 
growth rate and cost, everything else equal.14 To 
keep the analysis simple, when we simulate the 
biological case, we assume that there exists no 
economic heterogeneity so that, in terms of the 
economic parameters, each patch is identical. 
And when we simulate the economic case, we 
assume that there exists no biological 
heterogeneity. This allows us to focus specifically 
on the questions at hand. Of course, in practice 
these conditions are most likely intertwined. For 
example, in many fisheries, there is anecdotal 
evidence that the areas with highest biologically 
productivity are also areas where the cost per unit 
of harvest is the lowest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Closing High vs. Low Productivity Areas 
 
 
The results on the impacts of closing high 
versus low productivity areas are presented in 
Figure 4. Under the chosen parameters, both 
cases result in win-win scenarios over ranges of 
total effort whereby the systems are severely 
overexploited. Interestingly, the range of effort 
levels over which this occurs is larger when the 
lower productivity area is closed. In fact, over the 
whole policy-relevant range of effort levels, the 
license price is higher when the lower 
productivity area is closed. Since license prices 
represent the value of a policy in terms of fishery 
rents, these results suggest that closing low 
productivity areas might provide greater returns 
to the fishermen than higher productivity areas, 
everything else equal. This result was also found 
in Sanchirico and Wilen [2000], and was 
attributed to the fact that high productivity areas 
provide the highest pre-reserve returns to 
fishermen and hence the highest opportunity 
costs of closures. As it turns out, in many cases 
similar biological gains can be accrued by closing 
off lower productivity areas, while at the same 
time lowering the opportunity costs of the closure 
to the fishermen.  
 
As evident in Figure 5, the range over 
which the win-win occurs is larger when the 
higher cost area is closed than when the lower 
cost area is closed, everything else equal. Also, the 
differences between the two cases are smaller 
over the entire range of effort levels. We find, 
therefore, that it is no longer necessarily the case 
that closing the low cost area will yield a greater 
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Figure 5:  Closing High vs. Low Cost Areas 
 
 
 
chance of a win-win situation.15 In fact, in both 
cases, aggregate catches actually decrease under 
the parameters assumed. If total catches 
decrease, then how does the license price 
increase? Recall that the license price summarizes 
all of the available information in the fishery 
including ex-vessel prices, growth rates, harvest 
levels, and costs per unit of effort. In this case, the 
reserve shifts the spatial distribution of the catch 
to more profitable areas. The benefits of this shift, 
as measured by the license price, more than 
compensate for the loss in total catch, at least 
when total effort is in a neighborhood of open-
access levels.16  
These results suggest three important 
points. First, economic factors should be 
considered in siting decisions, if for no other reason 
than to reduce the opposition to sensible reserve 
plans. Second, some of the conventional wisdom 
that might be suggested from purely biological 
objectives (e.g., to close high productivity patches) 
may be reversed when one considers the economic 
costs to the industry of reserve siting. Third, if 
placed appropriately, reserves can improve the 
economic conditions of a fishery that is managed 
with non-spatially explicit instruments.  
   
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
This paper considers the manner in 
which the establishment of a marine reserve in a 
limited entry licensing system might affect 
fishermen. We utilize a simple metapopulation-
based biological model and append a behavioral 
model of fishermen that hypothesizes spatial 
movement in response to rent differentials. We 
simulate a limited entry system in which there is a 
fixed amount of total effort that then distributes 
itself over space, determining an endogenous 
license price reflecting the shadow value of 
another unit of effort.  
There are several qualitative conclusions 
that can be drawn from this simple analysis. First, 
license values are a gauge of aggregate system 
profits and hence, in principle, they can be used 
as a measure of the impact of reserves on the 
fishing industry. If a reserve is implemented that 
makes fishermen worse off in the aggregate, that 
outcome will be signaled with a drop in aggregate 
equilibrium license values and the reverse will 
happen when fishermen’s incomes are improved. 
Given the almost infinite range of design options 
possible for a system of reserves, it seems 
politically expedient to look for options that have 
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few negative or even positive impacts on fishing 
profits.  
Second, we show that the nature of the 
spatial dispersal system is important to the 
success potential of reserves. Closed systems 
increase aggregate biomass, but they cannot 
increase aggregate catch because there is no larval 
dispersal from the reserves. Open systems with 
linkages fare better. Generally in open systems, a 
reserve decreases rents and causes license values 
to fall. However, there are some circumstances in 
which a reserve actually increases rents. These 
are when the initial pre-reserve equilibrium is 
close to the open-access equilibrium (such as 
when the limited entry program barely limits 
entry), and when the high cost patch is designated 
the reserve. Thus a “win-win” situation requires 
special biological and economic preconditions.  
Third, we illustrate the intricate 
relationship between possible "win-win" 
scenarios and the location choice of the reserve. 
In systems where there exists biological 
heterogeneity, closing the lower productivity area 
reduces the opportunity cost of the closure to 
fishermen while still providing positive biological 
benefits. In open-access fisheries, earlier evidence 
suggested that closing the most profitable patch 
would likely produce win-win situations. In a 
limited-entry fishery however, both the amount 
harvested and the net returns per unit of harvest 
in the fishery determine whether aggregate 
license prices might increase. As a result, we find 
that closing the high cost area provides the most 
opportunity for a win-win result in a licensing 
limited entry setting.  
Fourth, we also find that getting the most 
out of reserves may call for additional policies. In 
particular, in many cases it may be necessary to 
reduce the limited entry fleet by buy-back or 
other means to tailor the fleet to the new 
bioeconomic post-reserve conditions. 
Alternatively, regulators might consider 
implementing area licensing rather than fishery-
wide licensing in order to further optimize effort, 
catches, and biomass distribution.   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
                                                                          
1 Note that we are taking a political economy perspective 
rather than a welfare economics perspective here.  We are 
looking for circumstances in which it is likely that natural 
proponents of reserves (marine ecologists and managers) and 
natural opponents of reserves (fishermen) might find 
themselves in agreement over a particular reserve formation 
plan. 
2 The literature on the potential impacts of marine reserves is 
expanding rapidly, and an in-depth literature review is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  Instead we point the interested reader 
to the following biological review articles: Davis and Dugan 
[1993]; Roberts and Polunin [1991]; Carr and Reed [1993]; 
Allison, Lubchenco and Carr [1998], Carr and Raimondi 
[1998]; Palumbi [1999], Boersma and Parrish [1999]; and the 
following economic review articles  (Farrow [1996]; Thomson 
[1998]; Sanchirico [2000].    
 
3 See, for example, the review articles by Levin [1976]; Hastings 
and Harrison [1994]; and Hanski [1999]. 
 
4 This lumped parameter representation is itself very stylized 
since it ignores important aspects of real population growth 
and dispersal dynamics including age- and size-specific 
mechanisms, selectivity issues, and more complicated 
spawner/recruit processes.  However, it is analytically 
tractable whereas richer models must be analyzed using 
simulation methods. 
 
5 The literature on reserves also discusses other formulations 
that depict uni-directional flow, generally assumed to be the 
result of oceanographic processes such as currents, winds, and 
temperature.  These models are often referred to as sink-source 
models (Pulliam [1988]; Tuck and Possingham[1994]), and they 
characterize dispersal flow as a process that is independent of 
population densities in the sinks.   
  
6 This will not be the optimal way to distribute effort over 
space, of course, since it is the outcome of a myopic, open-
access process.  It will also be the case that too much effort 
will be drawn into the whole system since effort will be 
responding to average and not marginal rents. 
 
7 For example, Sanchirico and Wilen [1999a] show how the 
spatial distribution of effort and the total amount of effort in 
an open-access system changes with different dispersal 
mechanisms, and with different kinds of biological and 
economic heterogeneity. 
 
8 Hannesson[2000] extends this framework to investigate the 
effects of reserve creation in the presence of random 
environmental shocks.  
 
9 As it is currently modeled, the license price is equivalent to a 
charge per unit of effort. 
 
10 This particularly simple structure is due in part to the fact 
that the rent function is linear in E.  This makes marginal 
rents equal to average rents, which simplifies the nature of the 
rent-dissipating relationships.   
 
 
11 We assume that the biological and economic system 
parameters are unchanged after an area is set aside.  This 
assumption might not hold in practice, however.  For example, 
the intrinsic growth rate of the stock in the reserve might 
increase after the area is set aside due to the elimination of 
harmful harvesting practices.  Another possibility is that the 
costs of harvesting in the open patches might increase due to 
an increase in congestion.  While these circumstances can be 
incorporated here in a structural way, they are incorporated in 
a reduced form model by Arnason [2000].  In that paper, 
Arnason provides a complementary framework to the model 
developed here, which illustrates the biological and economic 
trade-off inherent in reducing the amount of fishable area.   
 
12 In the cases where the n-patch biological system is fully 
integrated, for example, the equation for the license price is a 
n+1 degree polynomial.   
 
13 In this case, the program for determining the level of 
aggregate effort that maximizes aggregate rents is 
. 
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14 Note that both closures are simulated with the following 
growth rates r3=1.5*r, r2=r1=r. 
 
15 In Sanchirico and Wilen [2000], a win-win situation 
occurred when both aggregate catches and biomass increased.  
Aggregate catches are used as indicators for the impact of 
reserves on the open-access fishery because there is no long-
run economic change from reserves; rents are dissipated both 
before and after reserve creation. 
 
16 It is important to point out that the effort distribution with a 
common license price does not correspond in general to the 
optimal distribution.  As a result, there is an opportunity for a 
reserve to shift effort towards a more "economically favorable" 
distribution than that which occurred prior to the reserve.  In 
order to arrive at an optimal spatial distribution, policymakers 
would need to introduce spatially explicit license prices 
(Sanchirico and Wilen [1999b]).  In this case, it would not be 
possible for a reserve to redistribute effort in a manner that 
would increase the license price.   
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Abstract 
As we start the new millennium, it is apparent to 
all that fish resources and their habitats are in 
peril globally. The establishment of marine 
protected areas (MPAs) has gained a profile in 
fisheries management as having the potential to 
play a major role in the restoration of marine 
ecosystems. The current dialogue regarding their 
implementation includes a focus on scientific 
concerns, appropriate process, and potential 
long-term benefits of MPAs for fish ecosystems 
and humans. The consensus that human 
communities have an investment in healthy fish 
stocks begs discussion of the following: the 
importance of identifying and including different 
interest groups in the decision making process, 
determining both for whom fish stocks will be 
rebuilt and by what means they will be exploited, 
and revisiting notions of how we define the 
“experts”.  Access to the playing field of fisheries 
management has been the exclusive privilege of 
scientists and policy makers, giving these groups 
an obvious advantage when it comes to the 
construction of new knowledge systems. The 
inclusion of stakeholders is not a new idea in 
fisheries management, however there is still a 
notable absence of them in the decision-making 
arenas (Gerrard, 2000;  Neis, 1992). It is 
important that policy makers, and the researchers 
who inform them, seek out and include less 
visible user groups. Their participation in the 
initial stages of planning MPAs should help 
facilitate balanced discussions on what future 
fisheries and their technologies within the 
designated areas will look like. The concept of 
reinventing fisheries management is gaining 
momentum (Pitcher, Hart, and Pauly, 1998). A 
component of this should include challenging the 
way we conceptualize and legitimize the 
“experts”, thus ensuring that the inclusion of 
stakeholders results in more than just a physical 
presence in the negotiations. We need a new and 
inclusive respect for the different ways that 
people know the world of fish, one that will 
embrace participation, mentorship, co-authoring, 
and the interdisciplinary work of academics. 
 
Introduction 
 
“dans le vrai” the notion that positions 
formulated within an existing legitimated, 
discursive system, are more likely to be accepted 
or recognized as credible versus those offered 
from positions outside of  “le vrai”  
 
(Foucault, 1976, p 224) 
 
The intention of this paper is threefold: 1) to 
highlight the need for both identification and 
inclusion of different user groups in the initial 
planning stages of MPAs, 2) to present 
preliminary ideas on what future activities and 
methods of exploitation within these areas will 
look like, and 3) to emphasize the importance of 
challenging our notions of “experts”. The 
concerns being raised in this paper are of a 
sociological nature with a particular focus on 
issues relevant to those living in coastal 
communities that rely on small-scale fisheries. 
This discussion will be supported in part with 
illustrations from the Newfoundland fishery.  
 
 
Identification and Inclusion of 
Stakeholders 
 
Evidence suggests that marine protected areas 
have the potential to become an effective tool in 
resource management for the restoration of 
marine ecosystems (Sumaila, 1998; Weru, 1998). 
While it is recognized that not all species benefit 
from protected reserves, it has been established 
that over time there is generally an increase in 
species abundance and diversity within these 
areas (Weru, 1998). There is a growing body of 
literature that documents the effectiveness of 
MPAs on conservation of habitat and aiding with 
the recovery of overexploited species through the 
provision of a more efficient ecosystem based 
approach to management of coastal oceans 
(Anon., 2001). 
 
We now see increased support for the 
implementation  of  MPAs from two of society’s 
most powerful institutions: the international 
science community and national governments. 
The International Conference on the Economics 
of Marine Protected Areas, held at the University 
of British Columbia in July of 2000, which 
brought together academics from several 
countries to discuss MPAs, is one example of this. 
President Clinton’s recent announcement of the 
Executive Order that called for the establishment 
of a comprehensive national program to provide 
greater protection of American waters reflects the 
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growing concern of governments (news release, 
May 26, 2000).  While this support has evolved 
out of a genuine commitment to effecting positive 
change in the condition of the world’s marine 
environments, the track record to date of these 
two institutions with regards to fisheries 
management raises some concerns. 
 
The scientific community, working on the 
premise that nature behaves in a predictable 
manner, has been guilty of assuming that there 
can be accuracy in fisheries management  (Rose, 
1996; Steele et al., 1992; Costanza et al., 1997), of 
offering incorrect advice on stock size (Walters, 
1998; O’Boyle, 1993), and in some cases, of 
offering advice that reflects poor science (Steele et 
al., 1992).  Governments, for their part, have 
based management decisions on economic 
models that favor industrial fisheries whose goal 
is accumulation of wealth, to the detriment of 
fishers involved in livelihood or subsistence 
harvesting  (Davis, 1996). The last several decades 
have seen governments implement restrictive 
legislation that has resulted in loss of common 
access to, and privatization of, fishery resources 
(Kirby, 1982; Marchak, 1987; Matthews, 1993; 
Copes, 1998; Copes, 1999). Privatization in 
today’s global economic environment has meant 
fewer companies with greater wealth and the 
ability to transcend national boundaries for the 
purposes of increasing profits (Kurien, 1995).  
The actions of these two institutions have 
contributed to the unfortunate state that now 
exists for both marine ecosystems and those who 
depend on fish resources. Those who have been 
most impacted by the collapse of fish stocks, have 
had the least input into the management schemes 
that determine their futures. 
 
If all stakeholders are to have equitable 
representation of their interests through 
participatory action, they first need to be 
identified and this can prove to be a difficult 
process. There is a tendency to accept the myth of 
liberal democracy that states all voices are equal 
in society. Little attention is paid to the reality 
that some voices are significantly louder than 
others, thus having more access to, and clout 
within, the political and social arenas. While it 
may appear that different interest groups are 
being represented, upon closer examination, this 
is often not the case. O’Boyle (1993), in discussing 
the importance of defining membership of fishing 
groups, points out that while it is assumed that 
existing fishery associations represent the 
broader membership, often the protagonists in 
fisheries debates are discovered to be 
representing their own interests rather than those 
of the broader membership. An example of 
questionable representation by an officially 
recognized and legitimated organization of 
fishers, could be seen with the Fish Food and 
Allied Workers Union (FFAW), the official union 
of all fishers in Newfoundland. During the mid-
1980s when fish stocks were perceived by many 
to be in great danger due to the serious offshore 
exploitation, inshore fishers attempted to 
establish a separate inshore union, believing that 
it was not possible for the FFAW to effectively 
represent the conflicting interests of the offshore 
and inshore fishers.  While the attempt to join 
forces with a new union was unsuccessful, the 
FFAW was obliged to recognize the concerns of 
the inshore sector, and an inshore local was 
formed in the aftermath of the challenge. 
 
The identification of stakeholders does not always 
guarantee that their concerns will be addressed in 
a meaningful way. For example, there is a 
tendency for policy advisers to view the fishing 
industry as a predominately male occupation 
(Rowe, 1991) in spite of extensive documentation 
that highlights women’s involvement in fisheries 
(Gerrard and Groenbach, 1987; Caddigan, 1991; 
Antler, 1977; Silk, 1995). The refusal to 
acknowledge women in their roles as harvesters, 
processors, fish sellers or for their familial 
support services, has led to biased policies that 
promote gender inequalities (Rowe, 1991; Wright, 
1992; Neis, 1993).  The fishing industry globally is 
comprised of men, women, and children in 
extended families and communities that engage 
in harvesting, marketing, gleaming, processing, 
preparation for home consumption and 
administrative work (Fraga, 2000; Acejas et al., 
2000).  
 
 
Future activities and methods of 
exploitation 
 
If one of the intentions of developing MPAs is to 
restore stocks for commercial consumption, there 
needs to be a discussion regarding what future 
activities and methods of exploitation will take 
place within them. In order to put a face on the 
problem of fisheries degradation from a 
sociological perspective, one needs to look at who 
has taken control of the resource, what they have 
done with that privilege, and how traditional 
stakeholders have been affected. Globally there 
are 1000s of coastal communities with a historical 
attachment to near shore fish resources whose 
catches have always been dependent on natural 
cycles. The migration of Canada’s east coast cod 
and capelin stocks from the offshore to the 
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inshore, or the hydrological seasons in the Gulf of 
Guinea that generate fluctuations in species 
assemblages (Binet and Marchal, 1993) are two 
examples of this. Severe exploitation of fish stocks 
has led to the situation where these natural cycles 
are no longer producing viable fisheries for 
coastal communities. Given the tenuous state of 
both marine ecosystems and coastal 
communities, the importance of determining who 
will be the future benefactors of restored stocks, 
and through what activities and methods of 
exploitation, is self-evident.  
 
One component of this requires an in-depth 
analysis of why certain frequently cited 
assumptions remain relatively unchallenged 
within fisheries management despite the fact that 
many well-known and respected scholars have 
critiqued them. Gordon’s theory of common 
property (1954), expanded on by Hardin (1968), 
is one of them. This theory focuses on the 
perceived inability of individuals and 
communities to effectively manage the ‘commons’ 
and the belief that there are too many fishers 
chasing too few fish (for an extended critique of 
Hardin’s theory see McCay and Acheson, 1987; 
Matthews, 1993; Fairlie et al., 1995). With 
reference to Canada, Marchuk (1987) presents a 
convincing argument that suggests the tragedy of 
the commons might be more aptly described as 
“the tragedy of mismanaged state property” (p. 5) 
given that the present failure of fisheries has 
evolved during a time of extensive government 
regulation and restriction.   
 
Overcapitalization is another frequently cited 
cause of problems (Sissenwine and Rosenberg, 
1993), however the question is rarely posed in 
terms of overcapitalization of what sectors, and 
by whom? The drawbacks of subsidization of 
offshore fleets and privatization schemes such as  
ITQs have been critiqued by many (Marchuk, 
1987; Sinclair, 1988; Davis, 1996; Copes, 1998; 
Copes, 1999), yet they continue to stand in the 
forefront as justifications for a fishery that can 
take credit for the destruction of marine resources 
globally (Safina, 1995). These include the 
wholesale strip-mining of resources by 
inappropriate technologies, predominately owned 
by transnational companies who have no loyalties 
to local communities. 
 
There is also the myth of economic efficiency, a 
term that is invoked by governments as a 
rationale to justify offshore industrial 
technologies that employ fewer numbers of 
fishers (Storey, 1993). The technologies being 
used in commercial fisheries were initially 
developed with the intention of providing better 
access to unexploited stocks on a year round basis 
(Kodera, 1971). They have continued to evolve to 
the point where we now see purse seiners that 
catch thousands of kilograms of fish in a single 
haul, draggers with carrying capacities upwards 
of hundreds of metric tons of fish (Kodera, 1971), 
monofilament gillnets that when lost at sea 
become ghost nets which can continue to fish for 
years (Martin, 1997), fish finding sonar that can 
track fish anywhere, and deep water trawls that 
are able to exploit fish at increasingly greater 
depths (Junquera et al., 1992). While there have 
always been natural fluctuations in stock 
abundance (Sherman et al., 1993), there is now 
the ability, in conjunction with other 
anthropogenic pressures, to drive stocks 
worldwide into extinction. Economic efficiency is 
part of a powerful ideology used to justify on-
going state support for corporate fisheries. 
 
The activities of industrial fishing have led to a 
situation that is described by Pauly et al. (1998) 
as “fishing down the food web”. This refers to the 
pattern of systematically fishing our way through 
the piscivorous stocks of higher trophic levels, 
and then turning our efforts to smaller 
invertebrates of the lower trophic levels. The 
ecological impact is the degradation of marine 
resources, and there is a concern about whether 
stocks of the larger fishes can be rebuilt when 
their primary food sources are being 
commercially fished to the brink of collapse.   
 
This pattern of exploitation has serious social 
consequences in addition to the ecological ones. 
Complex social relations and inequities further 
exacerbate the loss of income that results from a 
shortage of fish. Using Newfoundland outport 
communities as an example, one can witness a 
concentration of benefits through limited 
licencing schemes that result in a small elite of 
fishers accessing high value stocks such as crab, 
shrimp and lobster.1 The shift to commercial 
exploitation of species such as shellfish sees fewer 
workers employed due to the highly mechanized 
nature of the fishery. In Catalina, Newfoundland, 
shrimp plant workers have decreased in numbers 
from twelve hundred to one hundred and fifty as 
a result of mechanization (Dr. Barb Neis, personal 
communication). Looking at the industry from a 
global perspective, shrimp is a product that can 
be harvested in one part of the world, and then 
                                                 
1 I witnessed this process first hand both as a full-time 
commercial fisher in Petty Harbor, Nfld. and also as a 
member of the Atlantic Fisheries Licencing Appeal 
Board in the mid-1980s. 
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shipped to another country in order to access a 
cheap labor pool. Once it is processed and 
packaged, it is then returned to first world 
markets where profits can be maximized. The 
creation of a large niche in first world markets for 
shrimp, has fueled third world fish farming that 
displaces people from their land, destroys 
mangrove swamps  (Acejas et al., 2000), and 
ignores poor working conditions for plant 
workers both in developed and in developing 
countries (Diaz, 2000; Ramos et al., 2000).  
Those who have the socially endorsed privilege to 
both legitimate and disseminate new knowledge 
need to be aware of the pervasive bias that 
continues to benefit the corporate elite within the 
fishing world. Globalization enables the 
exploitation of fish stocks worldwide by large 
industrial factory freezer trawlers that Kurien 
(1995) describes as global predators. The end 
result is fragmentation of communities and of 
lifestyles. Developing countries such as India 
have seen thousands of displaced workers in 
artisanal fisheries lose the ability to feed 
themselves and their families (Kurien, 1995). This 
raises the question: where is the viability of an 
industrial offshore fishery that requires 
unprecedented millions of dollars in government 
subsidies in order to stay afloat (Sutton, 1998), 
while using technologies which destroy stocks, 
ecosystems, untargeted species, and ocean 
bottoms? At this point in time, fish resources can 
either be placed back in the hands of coastal 
communities that have historical resource 
attachments to them or, the trend towards 
privatization that has seen an increasing transfer 
of fishing rights to corporate ownership can 
continue. MPAs may contribute to the restoration 
of degraded marine ecosystems however, 
implementation of them could result in final 
closure of the commons if consideration is not 
given to whom the future benefactors will be and 
acceptable models of exploitation. 
 
 
Redefining the Experts 
 
The recognized experts in fisheries management 
do not have a particularly notable track record to 
date, which suggests that it is time to reevaluate 
how we define “expert”. While it is not 
uncommon to encounter reference to the concept 
of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and 
acknowledgement that it represents a specific way 
of viewing the world (Neis, 1992; Salas et al., 
1998), there does not appear to be wide spread 
support within management regimes for 
recognition of TEK as an equally legitimate 
source of data to be used for management 
purposes. Traditional knowledge differs from the 
scientific method of research in that it is a highly 
deductive, experiential way of creating a working 
knowledge base. In contrast, the epistemological 
method of Western science research involves 
objectivity, isolation of minutiae, and intense 
observation of discrete pieces of the whole 
(Harding, 1986; Stanley and Wise, 1990; Fee, 
1983). Examples of Western research would be 
single species stock assessment; fish science 
studies on fish fecundity or, the study of a single 
haemoglobin in an arctic fish (Kunzmann et al., 
1992). From a sociological perspective, the 
problem that arises with research that derives 
from objective, quantitative methodologies is the 
risk of portraying a world view which is highly 
abstract in light of day to day lived realities. This 
kind of abstraction can produce a somewhat 
skewed vision of what actually takes place in the 
communities of people who are impacted by the 
loss of fishing, and the implementation of new 
resource management schemes.  
 
Another aspect of this debate is to question who 
are the benefactors of research funding in the 
wake of resource failures. The destruction of 
Canada’s East Coast cod stocks resulted in an 
influx of world-renowned fisheries scientists and 
academics, and likewise, generous amounts of 
grant money to study everything from the 
dynamics of cold oceans and seal diets, to 
analyzing the social impacts of the economic 
collapse of single industry towns. This can be 
witnessed in the plethora of research that has 
focused on the East Coast fishery, most of which 
has been funded by government grants.  Much of 
the research that was conducted in the aftermath 
of the Grand Banks collapse, confirmed what 
fishers had been arguing for years, yet their 
concerns were not taken seriously until they were 
legitimated by researchers and policy advisors. 
 
The question of where the research dollars go was 
raised recently at the Gender, Globalization and 
Fisheries conference, held in Salmoner, 
Newfoundland (May, 2000). This conference 
brought together an eclectic group of people that 
included fish workers from Atlantic Canada, 
researchers who work with NGOs and academics 
from eighteen countries. Many of the non-
academic participants voiced concerns about the 
lack of responsible research and the 
unwillingness of academics to acknowledge the 
contributions of community expertise to the 
research process. Likewise, many of the fish 
workers felt that researchers in general fail to 
acknowledge the contributions of local knowledge 
or provide appropriate feed back of research 
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results. They expressed the desire that some of 
the funding that goes to academics be directed 
towards communities that may have the ability 
and expertise to do their own brainstorming on 
solutions.  
 
The proceedings of the International Coral Reef 
Regional Symposium (Anon., 2000) confirm that 
this problem is a global one. In a lengthy 
discussion on MPAs, two issues of importance 
that are often overlooked were identified. One is 
that local people need to be provided with the 
opportunity to take a leadership role in making 
decisions, and the other is that researchers often 
neglect to provide crucial feedback to the 
communities in which they conduct their 
research. A recent Canadian study has identified 
that there are no effective policies in place to 
enable community participation in the creation of  
MPAs (Wallace and Boyd, 2000).  
 
 
Conclusion 
Critical to this discussion is the fact that there is 
no consensus on what does or doesn’t work 
within fisheries management. Neither is there 
consensus on the costs and benefits of large scale 
versus small-scale fisheries, on the ethics of 
privatization of resources, nor the analysis of the 
impacts of globalization. While there is 
considerable debate regarding the conflict 
between the demands of corporate interests to 
maximize their profits, and the need for 
communities to retain employment (O’Boyle, 
1993), the fact is that decisions in management 
have been weighted very much in favor of 
corporate interests (Matthews, 1995). If the 
process of designing and implementing new 
management schemes proceeds without 
appropriate consultation, and does not give equal 
weight to determinations of for whom, and by 
what means, resources will be accessed, then 
what little power and control coastal communities 
are presently struggling to maintain, will be 
seriously threatened. 
 
Researchers and managers are privileged to 
actively affect the knowledge production process. 
Given this, they have a moral and ethical 
responsibility to be aware of the repercussions of 
their work. With the creation of MPAs, this means 
being aware of who is excluded, whose voices 
aren’t being heard, and who stands to lose. There 
needs to be assurance that, should fish stocks be 
revitalized, appropriate methods of exploitation 
in the right hands will occur. It is a task only half 
done to figure out if the fish can be brought back, 
the other half is determining for whom the fish 
will be on reserve.  Learning to create decision-
making forums that encourage the broadest 
participation will be the key to successful results. 
Different ways that this can be accomplished are 
through conferences and workshops that 
encourage participation of those who are outside 
of traditional academic disciplines. The failure of 
centralized management regimes to protect fish 
stocks (Brown, 1998) has led to pressure from 
community groups to take back some control over 
resource management. Co-management and 
community management schemes are starting to 
show promise as new measures that can bridge 
the gap between policy makers and those involved 
in fisheries (McCay, 1989). Co-authorship, 
mentoring, interdisciplinary projects and respect 
for traditional ecological knowledge can also 
provide a platform for a broad range of concerns. 
We need to brainstorm ideas for discussion that 
will help ensure that the implementation of MPAs 
will proceed as the result of a most thorough, 
thoughtful, and inclusive process that will have 
given recognition to the concerns of all who stand 
to be impacted.  
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Abstract 
What bio-economic benefits can be expected from 
the implementation of marine protected areas 
(MPAs) in a fishery facing a shock in the form of 
recruitment failure, and managed cooperatively 
compared to non-cooperatively? What are the 
optimal sizes of MPAs under cooperation and 
non-cooperation?  I explore these questions in the 
current paper by developing a computational 
game theoretic model, which incorporates MPAs 
using the North East Atlantic cod fishery as an 
example. Results from the study indicate that 
MPAs can protect the discounted economic rent 
from the fishery if the habitat is likely to face a 
shock, and fishers have a high discount rate. The 
total standing biomass increase with increasing 
MPA size but only up to a point.  The study also 
shows that the economically optimal size of MPA 
for cod varies between 50 – 70% depending on (i) 
the exchange rate between the protected and 
unprotected areas of the habitat; (ii) whether 
fishers behalf cooperatively or non-cooperatively; 
and (iii) the severity of the shock that the 
ecosystem may face. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are parts 
of the marine habitat in which fishing is 
controlled or prohibited entirely for all or part of 
the time [see Bohnsack 1990 and Sumaila et al. 
2000]. The interest in MPAs as a tool for fisheries 
and ecosystem management has now gone past 
marine researchers and conservation groups to 
policy makers. Evidence of this is the May 2000 
Executive Order issued by the President of the 
USA calling for "appropriate actions to enhance 
or expand protection of existing MPAs and 
establish or recommend, as appropriate, new 
MPAs"1.   
Among the groundwork recommended to 
guide how to go about implementing the 
Executive Order is the "assessment of the 
economic effects of the preferred management 
solution”.2  The objective of this paper is precisely 
to provide an assessment of the economic 
performance of MPAs: Will the establishment of 
an MPA bring about significant biological and 
economic benefits if the management objective is 
to maximize the joint profits of fishers? What 
sizes of MPAs may be considered optimal under 
cooperation and non-cooperation? 
Published economic models that study 
the potential economic benefits of MPAs can be 
group into (i) single species/non-spatial/single 
agent (sole owner) models, for example, Holland 
and Brazee [1996], Hannesson [1998] and 
Sumaila [1998]; (ii) single species/spatial/single 
agent models, e.g., Holland [1998], Sanchirico 
and Wilen [1999]; (iii) multispecies or 
ecosystem/spatial/single agent models, for 
instance, Walters [2000] and Pitcher et al. 
[2000]; and (iv) multispecies or ecosystem/non-
spatial/single agent, e.g., Sumaila [1998]. To my 
knowledge, there are no multi-agent models that 
explore the economic potentials of MPAs in the 
literature. The current paper fills this gap by 
developing a two-agent game theoretic model for 
the assessment of MPA performance. With a two-
agent model, 1 address an important question, 
which until now has not been addressed in the 
literature, namely, how will MPAs perform when 
participants in a fishery cooperate, resulting in 
efficient management versus when they do not 
cooperate, leading to competitive and wasteful 
management.  
The North-East Atlantic cod fishery is 
used to demonstrate the workings of the model 
developed. This cod stock is highly migratory, 
working its way through both Norwegian and 
Russian Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), as 
well as international waters. Norway and Russia 
together determine the total allowable catch 
(TAC), giving each country approximately 45% of 
the TAC, with the remainder harvested by other 
countries, such as Iceland, the Faroe Islands and 
some EU countries. The Russian and other-
country catch is mainly harvested by trawlers 
offshore, while the Norwegian share of the TAC is 
divided between two vessel groups; trawlers and 
coastal vessels [see Armstrong and Sumaila 
2000]. Thus, the fishery is presently managed 
cooperatively [see Nakken et al. 1996], which 
makes the current model relevant for studying the 
fishery. 
I present the model in the next section. 
The results of the study are given in section 3, 
while the concluding remarks are presented in 
section 4. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
Biological aspects 
Let recruitment of age 0 fish to the whole habitat 
in period t (t=1..T), Rt, be represented by the 
following Beverton-Holt recruitment function.3  
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proportion of mature fish of age a (a=1..A); ws,a is 
the weight at spawning of fish of age a; na,t-1 is the 
post-catch number of age a fish in period t-1; and 
 and are constant biological parameters. The 
 and  values determine the recruitment for a 
given spawning biomass, which again determines 
the pristine stock level. 
α
α
 
Initially, it is assumed that the stock and recruits 
are homogeneously distributed, and randomly 
dispersed at a constant density. The fish 
population is split into two distinct components, i 
= 1,2 where 1 and 2 denote the protected and 
unprotected areas, respectively. There is net 
movement from the protected to the unprotected 
area, due to fish density being high relative to the 
carrying capacity in the protected section of the 
habitat (see the Basin model, MacCall, 1990). 
This movement is captured by the net migration 
rate, which tells us the net proportion of a given 
age group of fish that is transferred from the 
protected to the unprotected area in a given 
fishing period.  
 
The division of the habitat is done by first, 
dividing the initial stock size between the 
protected and unprotected areas in proportion to 
these areas’ respective sizes. Hence, an MPA 
consisting of 20% of the habitat, results in a split 
of the initial stock size into a 2:8 ratio in favor of 
the unprotected area. Second, it is assumed that 
recruitment takes place separately in the two 
areas defined as in equation 1 above, each area 
with its own  and , i=1,2. The  
parameter, being an intrinsic element of the stock 
under consideration, is kept equal for fish both in 
the reserve and in the fished area. Finally, the 
respective  parameters are set such that (i) the 
sum of recruitment from both areas satisfies 
Bt
i
−1 γ i α
γ
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and (ii) the recruitment into the protected and 
unprotected areas is directly related to the 
quantity of the biomass in them. These conditions 
are enforced by giving  values from 1 to 10 
depending on the MPA size, with a value of 1 
depicting a large MPA and a value 10 depicting 
small MPA.  
γ i
 
For the protected area, the stock dynamics in 
numbers, , is described by  na t,
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where the parameter s is the age independent 
natural survival probability of cod;  is the 
net migration of age a (where A is the last age 
group) cod from the protected to the unprotected 
area in period t, and 
ψna t,1
ψ  is as defined earlier;  
denotes the initial number of age a cod in the 
protected area. Recollect that there is no 
harvesting in the protected area.  
na ,0
1
The stock dynamics in the unprotected area are 
expressed as 
(4) 
( )
                                      
.         ,  
,0for          , 
,
2
0,
1
,
2
1,
2
1,1
2
,
2
,
1
,
2
1,1
2
,
2
,
22
,0
givennnnnshn
Aansnhn
Rn
atAtAtAtAtA
tatatata
tt
ψ
ψ
++=+
<<+=+
=
−−−
−−
 
where  is the total harvest function.  2,tah
The total harvest is defined in the traditional way 
as 
 
ttaata enqh
2
,
2
,  =  
 
where qa is the age dependent catchability 
coefficient, et, is the effort employed in the 
harvesting of cod in period t.  
 
I introduce a shock in the natural system (see 
Sumaila, 1998) by incorporating a recruitment 
failure (zero recruitment) that occurs in each of 
the years 5 to 15 of the 28 year-time horizon 
model. It is important to note that the shock is 
assumed to occur only in the fished area, an 
assumption which follows Lauck (1996), where it 
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is assumed that true uncertainty occurs due to 
human intervention in the natural environment, 
leading to over-fishing and habitat degradation. 
Sensitivity analysis is performed to study the 
effects of changes in the degree of shock and the 
exchange rate.  
 
Economic aspects 
A dynamic game theoretic model is applied to 
describe the cooperative and non-cooperative 
management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery 
in which there are two participants, namely, the 
coastal vessel group (cf) and the trawler gear 
group (tf). These are the two main vessel types 
used to harvest cod. The single period profit from 
harvesting fish, , is defined as  (.)mΠ
(5) 
b
tttaa
A
a
am eb
kenqwven +
= +−=∏ ∑ 12,02 )(1),(  
where m= cf, tf (cf stands for coastal fleet, and tf 
is the trawler vessel group)4. The variable et (t = 
1,2,..,T=28) denotes the profile of effort levels 
employed by the particular player; n2 is the age 
and time dependent stock size matrix in the 
fished area; v is the price per unit weight of cod; 
wa is the average weight of age a cod; k is a cost 
parameter, and b>0  is a parameter introduced to 
ensure strict concavity in the model, which is 
required to ensure convergence (see Flåm, 1993 
and Sumaila, 1997).  
 
I assume that under cooperation, the objective of 
the participants in the fishery is to find a 
sequence of total effort levels, et (t = 1,2,..,T=28) 
that would maximize their joint benefits. Using 
the effort level as the control variable, the vessel 
groups jointly maximize their present value of 
profit, Prof 
(6) 
∑
=
∏=
T
1t
t,j
t
jjofPr δ    
where is the discount factor, and r 
denotes the interest rate. The optimization is 
carried out for given sizes of the MPA, subject to 
equation (2), (3) and (4), and the obvious non-
negativity constraints.  
( )δ = + −1 1r
 
Under non-cooperation, I assume each agent 
wishes to maximize own profits, that is, ∏  and 
, respectively, for the coastal and trawler 
fleets. The non-cooperating agents must therefore 
choose their own effort levels in each fishing 
period in order to maximize own discounted 
profit, given that the other agent does the same. 
This is done without regard to the consequences 
of their own actions on the other agent’s payoff. 
For the coastal fleet this translates into choosing 
own effort level to maximize 
cf
tf∏
(7) 
∑
=
∏=
T
1t
t,cf
t
cfcfofPr δ  
Modified Lagrangian functions in the sense of 
Flåm (1993) and Sumaila (1997) are set up and 
computed using the simulation package known as 
Powersim. The computational procedure is 
resorted to because it is difficult to try to solve the 
current multi-cohort model analytically (see 
Conrad and Clark 1987).  
 
The solution procedure (algorithm) is from 
nonsmooth convex optimization, in particular, 
subgradient projection and proximal-point 
procedures (see for example, Flåm, 1993). This 
class of algorithms is intuitive because they are of 
"behavioristic" type: they model out-of-
equilibrium behavior as a "gradient" system 
driven by quite natural incentives. 
 
The Data 
 
The parameters α and γ are set equal to 3 and 1 
per billion kilograms, respectively, to give a 
billion age zero fish (assuming negligible weight 
at age zero) when the spawning biomass is half a 
million tons.5 Based on the reported survival rate 
of cod, s is given a value of 0.81 for all a. The 
price, v= NOK 6.78 and 7.466 per kilogram of cod 
landed by trawlers and coastal vessels, 
respectively (Sumaila, 1997). The cost parameter 
km,which denotes the cost of engaging a fleet of 
vessels (10 and 150, respectively for tf and cf) for 
one year, is calculated to be NOK 210 and 230 
million, respectively, and b is set equal to 0.01. 
The discount factor is given a value of 0.935 as 
recommended by Norway Bank. The initial 
number of cod of age groups 1 to 8 are obtained 
by taking the average of the initial numbers from 
1984 to 1991 reported in Table 3.12 of the ICES 
(1992). For the other age groups, I assume the 
same number as for age group 8. This gives 
(460,337,298,223,117,61,33,9,9,9,9,9,9,9,9) for 
a=1..15, resulting in an estimated initial stock size 
of 2.24 million tons. The parameter pm=0 for a<7 
and 1 otherwise; qa,tf=0 for a<5; qa,tf= 
0.032,0.062,0.075 for a= 4,5,6, respectively and 
qa,tf =0.084 otherwise. qa,cf =0 for a<7; and qa,cf = 
0.056,0.14,0.191,0.255,0.217,0.153,0.089,0.051,0
.0255, for  a=7..15, respectively.  wa = 
(0.1,0.3,0.6,1.0,1.4,1.83,2.26,3.27,4.27,5.78,7.96,9
.79,11.53,13.84,15.24,16.34) for a=0..15; and wsa 
is assumed to be 90% of wa (see Sumaila, 1995). 
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 3. The Results 
 
Plots of the economic rent and standing 
biomass as a function of the MPA size are 
presented in Figure 1 for both the cooperative and 
the non-cooperative management scenarios. The 
figure shows that total economic rent from the 
fishery is strongly related to the size of the MPA. 
The rent increases with the MPA size until an 
optimal size is reached at 60% and 70% under 
non-cooperative and cooperative management, 
respectively. With regards to standing biomass, 
we see a similar pattern, total standing biomass in 
both the protected and fished areas, increase with 
increasing MPA size. But contrary to what one 
would have expected, it peaks at the same MPA 
sizes as in the case of the economic rent. One 
would have expected the standing biomass to 
keep increasing linearly with size but this is not 
the case. The reason for this counterintuitive 
result is that after 60% and 70% of the habit has 
been protected under non-cooperative and 
cooperative management, respectively, optimal 
fishing in the unprotected area requires a much 
lower standing biomass in this part of the habitat, 
which is low enough to more than compensate for 
the higher biomass in the protected area. 
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Figure 1: Rent and standing biomass as a function of MPA size 
 
 
 
The base case results for key parameters 
of the model (discounted profits, standing stock 
biomass and MPA size) are presented in Table 1. 
The table reports the outcomes for the ‘with’ and  
 
‘without’ an MPA under both non-cooperative 
and cooperative management.  In the case of the 
‘with’ MPA, the MPA size that gives the highest 
discounted profits are reported. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Base case: Total discounted profits (in billion NOK), the average annual 
standing biomass (in million tones) and MPA size in percentage of habitat area. 
 
  Non-cooperative Cooperative 
Discounted profits  Trawlers 13.93 18.15 
(NoMPA) Coastal  12.60 16.82 
 Total 26.53 34.97 
Discounted profits  Trawlers 13.77 23.70 
(BestMPA) Coastal  16.50 22.37 
 Total 30.27 46.06 
Average stock biomass NoMPA 1.15 1.81 
 BestMPA 2.48 3.16 
 MPA-size (%) 60 70 
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We see that under the assumptions of the 
model, (i) MPAs are likely to give higher 
discounted profits from a fishery that is likely to 
face a shock. Under non-cooperative management 
fishers make a total of about NOK 30.27 billion 
with an MPA, compared with NOK 26.53 billion 
without an MPA. This is achieved with an MPA 
size of 60% of the habitat. The equivalent 
numbers under cooperation are NOK 46.06 and 
34.97 billion, respectively. In this case the 
optimal MPA size is 70%. To reveal the insurance 
value of MPAs under the two management 
regimes, I compared these numbers to the 
discounted profits that would be obtained when 
the habitat is assumed not to face a shock. This 
comparison showed that (i) MPAs manage to 
protect about 62% of the no shock returns to the 
fishery under cooperation, and 68% under non-
cooperation. 
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Figure 2:  Effort profile under cooperative and non-cooperative management 
 
 
It should be noted that in general higher 
economic benefits are achieved under 
cooperation than under non-cooperation. This is 
because fishers in a cooperative setting allow the 
resources to build to higher levels after the shock 
has occurred, by employing less fishing effort 
than under non-cooperation, especially during 
the initial periods of the time horizon of the 
model (see Figure 2). On average between 28 and 
35% more fishing effort is employed under non-
cooperative than under cooperative management. 
 
More fish is left in the sea “with” than 
“without” an MPA (see Table 1). Hence, the 
implementation of MPAs can protect and enhance 
the stock biomass by helping maintain high 
standing fish biomass under the scenarios 
explored. More fish is left in the sea under the 
cooperative management regime because fishers 
here already have an efficient management policy 
in place; hence, they are in a better position to 
reap benefits from the insurance cover that MPAs 
provide. This result leads to two interesting 
observations. First, fisheries with good 
management plans can, under certain situations, 
benefit from implementing MPAs. Second, MPAs 
are no panacea – they need to be implemented as 
complements to other traditional management 
tools.   
 
The discount factor, the exchange rate 
between the protected and unprotected areas, and 
the degree of shock introduced in the model were 
varied to examine how sensitive the model results 
are to changes in these parameters. The optimal 
MPA sizes remain the same except when a milder 
recruitment failure is assumed, and only under 
non-cooperative management (see Table 2). In 
which case, the optimal MPA size changes from 
60 to 50%. An interesting result from the 
sensitivity analysis is that at a high discount 
factor (98%), MPAs do not appear to enhance 
economic benefits. This is an indication that 
MPAs are a possible means by which to mitigate 
the negative effects of high discount rates in 
fisheries. This means that when fishers are very 
impatient, e.g. in developing countries because of 
the pressures of meeting basic needs, or when a 
fishery is operating under open access, MPAs 
could be employed as a tool to protect the stock, 
and mitigate economic waste.  
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Table 2: Sensitivity analysis: Total discounted profits (in billion 
NOK), the average annual standing biomass (in million tonnes) and 
MPA size in percentage of habitat area. 
 
Discount factor of 0.98 
 
  Non-cooperative Cooperative 
Discounted profits  Trawlers 23.57 48.91 
(NoMPA) Coastal  29.18 54.52 
 Total 52.74 103.41 
Discounted profits  Trawlers 24.32 36.00 
(BestMPA) Coastal  25.84 41.61 
 Total 50.17 77.60 
Average stock biomass NoMPA 0.91 2.50 
 BestMPA 2.12 2.91 
 MPA-size (%) 60 70 
 
Lower migration rate of 0.4 of biomass in protected area 
 
  Non-cooperative Cooperative 
Discounted profits  Trawlers 13.93 18.15 
(NoMPA) Coastal  12.60 16.82 
 Total 26.53 34.97 
Discounted profits  Trawlers 11.90 17.80 
(BestMPA) Coastal  12.79 16.46 
 Total 24.69 34.26 
Average stock biomass NoMPA 1.15 1.81 
 BestMPA 2.79 3.43 
 MPA-size (%) 60 70 
 
Milder shock – Recruitment failure from year 5 to 9   
 
  Non-cooperative Cooperative 
Discounted profits  Trawlers 13.07 17.05 
(NoMPA) Coastal  11.30 15.28 
 Total 24.37 32.33 
Discounted profits  Trawlers 14.77 24.09 
(BestMPA) Coastal  16.10 22.32 
 Total 30.87 46.41 
Average stock biomass NoMPA 1.36 2.02 
 BestMPA 2.50 3.17 
 MPA-size (%) 50 70 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Using the model developed in this article, 
I have demonstrated that MPAs can help protect 
losses in economic rent from a fishery in a real 
world situation, where shocks to the habitat are 
bound to happen from time to time. The 
establishment of MPAs could help maintain high 
fish biomass in the marine habitat. This is the 
case whether fishers behave cooperatively or not. 
Hence, this study brings to the fore the insurance 
value of MPAs, as argued by, among others, Clark 
[1996] and Lauck [1996].  
 
 
 
The paper also shows that for the full 
economic benefits of reserves to be realized they 
have to be implemented as part of an efficient 
management package. The article isolates the 
differences in economic and biological outcomes 
depending on whether the fishery is managed 
cooperatively or non-cooperatively. Finally, it is 
demonstrated that MPAs could serve as useful 
fisheries management tool when fishers have high 
discount rates, and are therefore very impatient. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 I thank Scott Farrow for alerting me to this information. 
2 Executive Order 13158, May 26, 2000 available at 
www.whitehouse.gov. 
3 This function is chosen because recent biological studies 
have shown that it is more realistic than the Ricker 
recruitment function for species such as cod (Pitcher and 
Guénette, pers. comm.). 
4 Clearly harvest costs may be affected by the MPA size, 
making for longer travel distance. However, this would 
depend on the structure and positioning of the MPA, as well as 
the fisher’s alternatives, issues that are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
5 This is the minimum spawning biomass recommended to 
ensure the long term sustainability of the North-east Atlantic 
cod (Nakken et al., 1996).                
6 A US$ is equal to about NOK8.80 in October 2001.  
 
 
Questions:  
 
Scott Farrow: Is your non-cooperative solution like 
open access, or like a monopoly? 
 
Ussif Rashid Sumaila: It is not as extreme as open 
access, so rent is not completely wasted. 
 
Yvonne Ortiz: All the graphs show declining biomass at 
the end regardless of whether MPAs were there or not. 
 
Ussif Rashid Sumaila: This is because by the time we 
get to the end, it is like the end of the world is here 
because we are approaching the last period of the 
model.  It does not matter whether we have MPAs or 
not. 
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PAPERS IN ABSTRACT 
 
This section reports the abstracts of papers, and their 
discussion, that were delivered orally at the 
conference, but that were not submitted as papers for 
this publicati0n. 
 
MARINE PROTECTED AREAS AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
Louis W. Botsford1, James E. Wilen2 and Alan 
Hastings3 
1Dept. of Wildlife, Fish, and Conservation Biology 
2Dept. of Agriculture and Resource Economics 
3Dept.  of Environmental Science and Policy, 
University of California, Davis, CA, USA 
 
Marine protected areas have been proposed to 
increase fishery yield and reduce uncertainty in 
fishery management.   Several studies have 
indicated that they provide the former primarily 
when the fishery would otherwise be overfished  
We focus here on the latter.  We show that while 
MPAs  may reduce the uncertainty in specifying 
removals from the population, uncertainty in the 
level of removal tolerable for sustainability 
remains, and a new source of uncertainty 
associated with larval dispersal is introduced.  
These affect the relative economic advantage of 
MPAs over classical management by effort 
control. 
 
 
ESTABLISHING MARINE PROTECTED AREAS: 
SOCIOECONOMIC AND BIODIVERSITY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Anthony T. Charles 
Management Science / Environmental Studies, Saint 
Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada 
 
The use of marine protected areas (MPAs) has 
become a widely recognized tool for maintaining 
and enhancing marine ecosystem health, and for 
helping to achieve sustainable fishery systems. 
However, the establishment of MPAs is clearly not 
a straightforward task. This paper examines 
socioeconomic and biodiversity issues arising in 
MPA design, with emphasis on the implications of 
heterogeneity within the human system and the 
natural ecosystem. On the human side the one 
hand, an MPA can have differential impacts on the 
various players involved, possibly leading to a lack 
of acceptance and a loss of potential benefits. This 
highlights the importance of considering matters of 
process and distribution in MPA design. At the 
same time, the possibility of spatial heterogeneity 
in fish stocks (for example, involving an uncertain 
distribution of genetically-distinct sub-stocks) 
implies that MPAs can impact on biodiversity in 
both desirable and undesirable ways. Simulation 
models are developed and utilized to aid in the 
analysis of these socioeconomic and biodiversity 
implications. 
 
Questions 
 
Rögnvaldur Hanneson: Is there a feedback link 
between profits and fishing efforts? 
 
Anthony Charles: This is a case where institutional 
assumptions are important.  This model is not open 
access in the traditional sense. It assumes a degree of 
territorial rights and much more of a natural limitation 
to available fishing time, which seems to be the case in 
many artisanal fisheries. 
 
Ussif Rashid Sumaila: How does uncertainty figure in 
your model? 
 
Anthony Charles: At the moment, it is not included, 
although I have another model that focuses on 
uncertainty and impacts on uncertainty.  The key here 
was to focus on distribution.  Uncertainty will 
complicate the model, but it will not affect the results 
so much as the perception of results.  Are there 
ecosystem benefits?  That is the big uncertainty. 
 
 
FISHERIES AND NATURE CONSERVATION – TWO 
OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS ? 
 
Ralf Döring 
Botanical Institute – Dept. of Landscape Economics, 
University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany 
 
The discussion about creating marine protected 
areas is controversial. Nature conservationists 
want to protect parts of the marine ecosystem. 
They are emphasising the need for protection of 
spawning grounds, rare marine habitats, rare bird 
species etc. Fishermen declining these need. They 
are stressing that although they use the ecosystem 
valuable habitats exist. However no-take-zones 
(often spawning grounds) were established by 
fishermen. So, obviously no-take-zones are useful 
for protection of fish stocks and habitats as well. 
But a well protected area needs a buffer zone. To 
bring this two positions together here it is to ask 
whether the aim of conservation there could be 
reached with some sort of ‚environmental 
acceptable fishing practice‘.  
The paper describe the controversies about a 
possible protected area at the Baltic Sea coast of 
Germany. Some parts of this area are out of use 
voluntarily to preserve juvenile fish stocks. From 
a nature conservationist point of view this area 
should be a reserve to protect a feeding ground 
for rare bird species in winter. It seems that both 
positions could be reached with a no-take-zone 
for parts of the ecosystem. Around this full 
protected area a buffer-zone could be established 
 237 
were an environmental friendly fishing technique 
might be used to support the aim of conservation.  
The markets for fish don’t honour an 
environmentally sound fishing practice at the 
moment. So, to create more acceptance the 
fisherman should be paid for the use of 
environmental acceptable fishing gear in this area 
as long as this fisheries must compete with other 
fisheries on the same markets. In Germany 
products from organic farming reached good 
market prices and market positions. It seems 
possible that fish products from environmental 
sound fisheries will be part of this market in the 
future. 
 
Keywords: Nature Conservation, Acceptance of 
no-take 
 
Questions 
 
Darwin Hall: In California, there is an organization of 
farmers that started in the 1980s, to give certification 
to organically grown foods.  They started out self-
certified, and then introduced the certification in the 
legislation in the state of California.  Are there groups 
of fishers in Germany that can take on that role?  
 
Ralf Doering: No, it is different in Germany.  There is a 
big organization, and farmers can go into this 
organization and agree to its rules to be certified.  I 
hope fishermen can have these organizations, but it is 
hard to say that a particular fish is “organic”, so there 
has to be a way to determine certification.  Also, 
fishermen do not operate in groups – certification is 
individual.   
 
Darwin Hall: In agriculture, they can go to the sites 
and see how the crops are grown, as well as records 
that farmers use for tax records.  An analogous scenario 
with fishermen would be observing equipment or going 
on trips with fishers to see if they are familiar with the 
site they claim to fish in. 
 
 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES 
TOWARD PROTECTED AREAS IN THE OCEAN 
 
Vikki Spruill1, Susan Boa1, Lisa Dropkin1 and Mark 
Mellman2 
1SeaWeb, 1731 Connecticut Ave, NW, Washington, DC, 
USA 
2The Mellman Group, Washington, DC, USA 
 
The current U.S. policy discussion of protected 
ocean areas encompasses both changes to the 
National Marine Sanctuaries program and the 
establishment of new Marine Protected Areas.  In 
fall 1999 SeaWeb, funded by the Goldman Fund, 
commissioned a public opinion poll to examine 
Americans’ attitudes toward protected areas in 
U.S. ocean waters. The survey was designed to 
test public support for establishing protected 
areas and strengthening protections within 
existing U.S. Marine Sanctuaries.  The poll also 
measured perceptions of the condition of the 
ocean, perceived problems facing the ocean, and 
attitudes toward human activity and use of 
resources within protected areas.  Finally the 
survey tested persuasive messaging to determine 
how to best to communicate about protected 
areas.  
 
The survey found that Americans express affinity 
for and concern about the oceans, although they 
continue to hold misconceptions about threats to 
ocean health.  Most view oil pollution as the most 
significant ocean threat, while fewer understand 
the impact of run-off and overexploitation of 
ocean resources. Despite some confusion as to 
how specific areas in the ocean can be 
distinguished for protection, Americans express 
strong support for establishing protected areas 
that limit or prohibit damaging human activities.  
Americans are largely unaware of the existing 
Marine Sanctuary program and believe this 
program should be modified to prohibit those 
commercial and recreational activities that are 
harmful to wildlife and habitat.  The study shows 
that there is opportunity to create a new debate 
about ocean protected areas, but that a successful 
campaign must reconcile differences between 
Americans’ concerns and the science of protected 
areas.  The survey suggests successful public 
communications will reinforce a theme of human 
dependence on the ocean and the damage already 
done. 
 
The survey interviewed  802 adult Americans 
nationwide. The margin of error is +/- 3.5 
percentage points at the 95% confidence level.   
 
Questions 
 
Saudiel Ramirez-Sanchez: Would it not be more 
important to assess people’s understanding on how 
science works rather than assessing people’s opinions 
about specific environmental issues? 
 
Nancy Baron: It is hard to do it in a short piece, but a 
feature piece can get into detail.  For instance, I did a 
feature on the Fisheries Centre, and it was possible to 
get into details of Ecopath and other modeling 
techniques.  It depends on the media and the audience 
as well. 
 
Lisa Dropkin: A public education campaign is massive 
and expensive, with very little return. We compete with 
lots of other information. Americans see, on average, 
more than 30,000 commercials in a year.  The factual 
data that people assimilate is very little. 
 
Michael Murphy: With regards to terminology, I 
noticed that you were talking about MPAs in this talk, 
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but in surveys you referred to “ocean protected areas”, 
“coastal protected areas”, “marine sanctuaries”, etc.  In 
the scientific community we do not use these terms.  It 
seems that using “coastal protected areas” got a better 
response from the public. 
 
Lisa Dropkin: Language is indeed important.  We did a 
follow up survey where we looked at the effects of using 
“marine reserves” versus “ocean protected areas” 
versus “marine sanctuary”, and it turned out that using 
“Marine Protected Areas” did the best in getting the 
gist of the concept across.  There is a lot of language 
work to do. We need to be careful when going out and 
emphasizing “coastal protected areas” because we do 
not want to burn ourselves further down the road when 
we put MPAs in other areas.  What the public consider 
“coastal” and what we consider “coastal” are different. 
 
 
CAN TRADITIONAL FISHERMEN AFFORD NOT TO 
GUIDE? 
TRADEOFFS OF WHALE SHARK TOURISM VS. 
FISHING ON SPAWNING AGGREGATIONS IN A 
PROPOSED MARINE RESERVE 
 
Rachel T. Graham1,2 and William D. Heyman2 
1 Environment Department, University of York, York 
2 The Nature Conservancy, Belize Marine Program, 
Punta Gorda, Belize 
 
The wisdom of fishing spawning aggregations has 
increasingly come under fire from 
conservationists following the collapse and 
elimination of many key aggregations worldwide.   
Fully-protected marine reserves, areas closed to 
all fishing, are seen as possible means of 
protecting vulnerable fish stocks and critical sites 
such as spawning aggregations.  The 
sustainability and successful local ownership of 
proposed marine reserves often hinges on the 
development of economic alternatives with 
former users of the areas protected.   This 
transition period often requires additional capital 
outlays and training which can be can be 
facilitated and co-financed by outside groups.  We 
present the case for tradeoffs between whale 
shark guiding and commercial fishing in the 
proposed no-take zone of the Gladden Spit 
Marine Reserve by comparing catch per unit 
effort and revenue of the fishery to effort and 
revenue from guiding.  This site harbours the last 
commercially fished snapper spawning 
aggregation on the Belize Barrier Reef and a 
seasonally predictable aggregation of whale 
sharks.  Over the past 20 years snapper landings 
have declined significantly while tourism interest 
in the whale sharks has increased.  Declaration of 
a reserve at this site will displace fishers, and 
some perceive a reserve as threatening their 
livelihoods (even though a reserve would almost 
certainly enhance fishery sustainability).   
Economic alternatives such as whale shark 
guiding and recreational fishing are being 
developed to facilitate the shift away from 
unsustainable fishing practices and promote local 
ownership and stewardship of the reserve’s 
resources.  Several fishers have already made the 
transition to tour guides, and tourist demand 
appears to outstrip guide supply and the pull of 
this lucrative activity outweighs the increased 
effort and declining income associated with 
fishing the spawning aggregation. 
 
Keywords: whale sharks, spawning 
aggregation, economic alternatives, marine 
reserve, guiding. 
 
Questions 
 
Jean Boncoeur: On the island on the northern shore of 
the Honduras, the main season for mutton snapper 
spawning is October to November.  Is that the same 
stock as the one you refer to in your paper, since they 
have a different spawning season?  
 
Rachel Graham: We are seeing different spawning 
seasons for snappers. We are working with people from 
the Honduras to see if they come from the same stock.  
There are some tagging experiments going on, and we 
are seeing large-scale migrations in the snappers. 
 
Daniel Holland: You said there were some small areas 
within the marine reserve.  If these small areas are no-
take areas, what is controlled in the other areas of the 
marine reserve? 
 
Rachel Graham: In those areas, only recreational 
fishing is allowed. They are trying to determine the 
regulations on it – do they put a limit on catch per day?  
How would they enforce it?  They are still trying to 
decide on things like that. The procedure for setting 
protection on this area got raced through because the 
Minister of Agriculture and Fishing really likes this 
area and he knows how slowly these things take place.  
Usually going through the bureaucracy to set up a 
protected area takes six to seven years, but this one 
only took two. 
 
Sean Hastings: In the community consultations, who 
actually drew the lines for the areas, and when were the 
lines drawn? 
 
Rachel Graham: The lines were drawn by three 
fishermen and Will Heyman in April 2000.  They have 
been circulated to a certain degree, but there are lots 
more consultations to do.  Will went out with the 
fishermen and set the nursery areas as a no-take zone.  
It was the fishermen who suggested that the nursery 
areas be set as a no-take zone.  We need more input 
from other fishers, but it is a start. 
 
Jackie Alder: You presented whale shark tourism as an 
alternative economic industry for the fishers, but this 
only happens for two months of the year.  What do 
fishermen do for the other ten months? 
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Rachel Graham: Although fishermen fish year-round, 
they only spend 4 months of the year fishing in that 
area anyway, so the trade-off is not so bad.  Whale 
shark tourism will not be the only thing they do.  If they 
did recreational fishing tours as well, they could go 
right through the general use area all year. 
 
 
STAYING AFLOAT: DEVELOPING ECONOMIC 
ALTERNATIVES WITH FISHERMEN, TO SUPPORT 
THE DECLARATION, MANAGEMENT, AND LOCAL 
OWNERSHIP OF MARINE RESERVES IN BELIZE 
 
William D. Heyman1 and Wil Maheia2 
1The Nature Conservancy, Belize Marine Program, 
Belize 
2Toledo Institute for Development and Environment 
(TIDE), Punta Gorda, Belize 
 
Scientific and technical studies have 
demonstrated how marine reserves can effectively 
improve fish stocks over time by promoting 
emigration and larval dispersal.  However, 
fishermen still have to feed their families every 
day.   As fisheries resources are steadily declining 
in southern Belize and more marine reserves are 
declared to protect marine resources and 
accommodate tourism, fishermen are increasingly 
seeking economic alternatives to “stay afloat”.   
Belizean non-government organization, TIDE, 
along with The Nature Conservancy, have 
embarked on a comprehensive program 
retraining fishermen in Southern Belize to work 
in new industries that are consistent with the 
sustainable management of marine reserves.  The 
alternatives were chosen based on criteria 
including socio-cultural acceptance, economic 
potential, and compatibility with the local 
environment.  Retraining has focused primarily 
on tour-guiding, and includes catch and release 
fly fishing guiding, kayak guiding, and scuba dive 
guiding.   As a result of this two-year participatory 
process, tour guides have become active stewards 
and supporters of three marine reserves in 
southern Belize.  The economic implications of 
both commercial fishing and the alternatives will 
be discussed and compared.   
 
Questions 
 
Tanya Dobrzynski: You say that tourist demand for 
tours does not exceed supply.  Is there a possibility that 
in the future, it will exceed supply and tourism will 
become unsustainable?   
 
Rachel Graham: The guides take tourists out in small 
boats, with only a few people in one boat, so the impact 
on the ecosystem is low.  Tourists do not want to be 
packed into little boats.  They want to have a private, 
personal experience. I do not think tourism will grow 
too quickly in the future. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Trond Bjorndal 
Let me start with the topic that Rögnvaldur 
Hanneson brought up at the beginning of the 
conference, that he believes that MPAs are of 
limited economic benefit.  Do you still feel this 
way after hearing today’s empirical studies, and 
can you comment on using MPAs as a part of 
optimal fisheries management? 
 
Rögnvaldur Hanneson 
I do not think any of the papers that were 
presented refute the idea that MPAs do not much 
improve upon open access fisheries.  As for the 
second question on how MPAs can supplement 
the current management system, there are many 
cases in the world where it is not possible to 
implement ideal management, like ITQs.  What 
can you do then?  In such cases MPAs might 
compensate for things you cannot do. I think I 
mentioned reef fisheries as an example of how 
MPAs could compensate for the impossibility of 
putting ITQs in place.  Some of the examples we 
heard today support that contention.  It was very 
interesting to hear from Rachel where fishermen 
have found it in their best interest to switch from 
fishing to tourism.  Fisheries and fish resources 
differ greatly from one part of the world to 
another, and we are all influenced by the reality 
we live in. I myself am most familiar with 
fisheries that produce material benefits and so 
tend to view fisheries in that light. I will not 
apologise for that.  In many parts of the world, 
ocean resources have uses other than for food, 
and in that case MPAs can be useful to allocate 
fish resources to the most preferential use or to 
reach a compromise between conflicting uses. 
 
Anthony Charles 
I was pleased with the blend of models with case 
studies and practical work so far in this 
conference. 
I think there is a place for both approaches.  
Meta-analyses with case studies combined with 
models would be useful.  I was impressed that 
both theoretical and practical applications dealt 
with both spatial and human distribution.  Both 
methods are fascinating from a research point of 
view, and also practically important, like in the 
case of Belize. This heterogeneity is at the 
forefront of the MPA issue. 
 
Trond Bjorndal 
Does anyone want to elaborate on the benefits 
from MPAs?  
 
 
Callum Roberts 
Mallory King did her thesis on looking at the 
benefits of MPAs and who would benefit, with a 
case study in Kasidy National Marine Park.  She 
started out thinking that there would not be much 
benefit to MPAs, but the problem with many 
marine reserve studies is that they drew measures 
of benefits much too narrowly, so instead she 
looked at measures of security.  She looked at how 
food security of households was connected with 
distance to MPAs.  Those near MPA boundaries 
were more secure; not that fish catch increased, 
but the CPUE decreased so the benefits coming 
from alternative jobs that the people could take 
on are feeding back into local communities. The 
people who benefited least were fishermen.  They 
are the least able to take advantage of MPAs, so 
you have to give them access to alternatives. 
 
Nina Mollett 
This is a follow-up on Trond’s question.  I am 
working in Juneau, for the National Marine 
Fisheries Services.  Alaskan fisheries are already 
highly regulated with ITQs.  We are looking at 
marine reserves as an option amongst many.  
What do you do if already have good management 
system in place?  What benefits would MPAs 
bring in then? 
 
Gordon Munro 
Marine reserves are important if some kind of 
management procedure is already in place, so 
that MPAs act as a supplement.  The quote I read 
this morning in the newspaper stresses the degree 
of risk with the current management system, and 
it looks at marine reserves as enhancing the 
current system.  If you are looking for benefits, it 
is not good enough to say that the expected 
returns are greater with open access.  The real 
tradeoff is between the expected return and the 
safety of the fishermen’s jobs. 
 
Ussif Rashid Sumaila 
There will be papers presented tomorrow that will 
address these questions, so perhaps we should 
wait and see what they have to say. 
 
James Sanchirico 
For MPAs to present a win-win situation, where 
both the industry and the biological system will 
benefit, requires that the ecosystem in question is 
already over-exploited.  In an over-exploited 
situation, setting aside a place will not affect a 
fishery much since there is not much there to be 
fished anyway, but in an optimal fishing setting, 
fisheries will lose because they will be losing 
fishing grounds. 
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Rachel Graham 
We found that for our study in Belize, promoting 
fishermen exchanges is highly useful.  We are not 
getting people to set aside areas or to change 
fishing methods; what we are doing is getting 
people to go to Guatemala, Jamaica, and the 
Honduras to see what the effect of not having a 
marine reserve can do to the ecosystem, and they 
come back and say that they are convinced that 
they need a marine reserve.  If you get them to go 
to very depleted places, they can see for 
themselves.  This will facilitate fishermen for joint 
discussions to garner support for marine reserves, 
and it is very effective.  It is a community-based 
decision making process.  This is partly the cause 
for such a rapid designation of the marine 
reserve. 
 
Anthony Cox 
This is a follow-up to Gordon’s comments.  An 
issue that economics tend to duck in this debate is 
that it is not only the returns that matter, but also 
distribution.  Traditionally, we say that as long as 
the aggregated net benefits are positive, then we 
assume that the political system will take care of 
the distribution, but that is not what happens.  
Also, in a public assessment poll, it was found 
that risk assessment matters as well.  Some points 
need to be made about the results that Lisa 
shows:  there is a distinct difference between 
what scientists see and what the public sees as 
key issues.  There is also a big gap in the opinion 
polls on the actions that people think need to be 
done, and what they are willing to pay.  The 
distribution and perception issues are linked, and 
that is another thing that needs to be worked on. 
 
Tony Pitcher 
It seems to me that since 1997, which is the last 
time we talked about this, there has been a shift 
in scientific opinion as well. I am not hearing the 
same arguments as I heard last time, like the 
contention that fishing causes no damage so 
MPAs are not necessary.  People now seem to 
accept that MPAs are there now and that there 
are benefits to be had. From the economic side, 
the same argument that MPAs can offer no 
benefit is still in place, but that is something we 
could work on.  Social benefits are another issue 
that was hardly mentioned in 1997 meeting, but 
people can now mention these other, non-
monetary benefits that can come from MPAs.  So, 
on the ecological and social sides, there has been 
a shift in opinion. We still need to hear from 
economists on the second day of the meeting. 
 
Eric LeBrun 
In many of the models that have been presented, 
there has been a very strong assumption that 
MPAs have a positive impact due to migration of 
fish from MPAs to fishing grounds.  Have there 
been any cases proven or observed that show the 
positive effects of fishermen on fishing grounds? 
 
Callum Roberts 
In one instance in St. Lucia, biomass has tripled 
inside the MPA and doubled outside over a period 
of three years.  Here they have established a large 
percent of coral reef habitat (35-40%) as a 
reserve.  There is a study in the Philippines which 
shows that there is a higher density of fish in 
reserves - that over a number a years a spill-over 
problem is created.  However, there is not enough 
data to assess this yet, and more collaborative 
studies/data sets are needed. 
 
David Whitmarsh 
There is evidence, a measurable effect, in 
northwestern Sicily of increased biomass leading 
to higher fishing incomes in areas around MPAs 
that started ten years ago.   
 
Darwin Hall 
For many different kinds of fish or marine 
animals, size affects fecundity, and we would 
expect an increase in growth rate for fish in 
MPAs. Which of the three models that we have 
just seen best takes that into account? 
 
Ragnar Arnason 
I certainly included it in my model – not 
explicitly, but implicitly as a shift in the growth 
factor. 
 
As a comment on the earlier discussion, we have 
to show that a shift in the biomass growth 
function takes place (second-order effect), not 
just a shift in the biomass itself (first-order 
effect). 
 
Ussif Rashid Sumaila 
In my model, I use a Beverton-Holt recruitment 
function whereby changes in fecundity can be 
taken into account. 
 
Darwin Hall 
Does the fecundity change with the age of fish in 
the Beverton-Holt model? 
 
Ussif Rashid Sumaila 
The function works like this:  if the fish is one 
year old, it is not in the function because it has 
not reached reproductive maturity yet; if the fish 
is four years old, it is 50% included in the 
function; if the fish is eight years old, it is 100% 
included in the function. 
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Darwin Hall 
There is a bioeconomic flipside:  there is talk 
about MPAs and fishers going to the borders of 
MPAs.  Although going out to the borders of 
MPAs can take a longer time, the amount of time 
necessary to look for fish once there may become 
lower.  Do the models account for that? 
 
Ragnar Arnason 
Yes, it is included in my model. 
 
Rachel Graham 
I do not understand how these models take into 
account the geographical and ecological spawning 
aggregations, and how MPAs affect that. 
 
Ragnar Arnason 
The model suggests a simple shift in the biomass 
growth function, and that covers aggregations, 
changes in fecundity, etc.  However, in spite of 
that, it is still difficult for me to show the benefits 
of MPAs. 
 
James Sanchirico 
People take too much from the models. 
Remember, models are only illustrative of the 
things going on in the world.  Sometimes people 
forget that.  You have to ask yourself what 
spawning aggregations do, and ask what the 
models do to simulate the effect and whether they 
are sufficiently robust. 
 
Louis Botsford 
I do not think any of our models are spatially 
heterogeneous or include full life-history 
considerations. 
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SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE 
 
THE “NEW”EMERGING ECONOMICS OF 
MARINE PROTECTED AREAS 
 
Scott Farrow 
Carnegie Mellon University 
 
 Policy interest and research in Marine 
Protected Areas has grown rapidly in recent 
years, even attracting the attention of the U.S. 
President who issued an executive order calling 
for "appropriate actions to enhance or expand 
protection of existing MPAs and establish or 
recommend, as appropriate, new MPAs."  Among 
the tools and guidance recommended for use in 
this effort is an "assessment of the economic 
effects of the preferred management solution.1   
The research for the conference is 
consequently both more focused and advanced 
than the eclectic survey in Farrow (1996) on the 
emerging economics of marine protected areas.  
In the following pages, the conference 
presentations are mapped into key topics from 
the earlier review and new topics are identified 
both from conference presentations and from 
more general areas of economics. 
 As a result of work on MPA related 
projects with the U.S. Man and Biosphere 
program, Farrow (1996) raised six questions that 
he thought would help link the interests of MPA 
managers, often trained in the natural sciences, 
with those of economists.  After reviewing the role 
of benefit-cost analysis and economic efficiency, 
the questions asked regarding the emerging 
economics of MPAs were:   
 
• Are MPAs economically justifiable? 
• Where to draw boundaries ? 
• Can diversity and species survival be 
included? 
• Is every MPA an island? 
• Is passive use value relevant? 
• Are MPAs politically supportable? 
 
 The papers of the conference can be 
mapped reasonably well into these topics.  Table 1 
below provides the mappings of this author, using 
the first author from the conference. 
 
 While no such mapping is exactly 
accurate, the focus of the conference papers 
tended to emphasize two areas: 1) whether MPA’s 
                                                 
1 Executive Order 13158, May 26, 2000 available at 
www.whitehouse.gov. 
can be economically justified, often stated solely 
in terms related to the fishing industry, and 2)  
what activities generate or sustain political 
support for the distributional impacts of MPA’s2. 
 Topics receiving attention at the 
conference that were largely absent in the earlier 
survey included uncertainty and the advances in 
the spatial modeling of fisheries.  The papers at 
the conference were an impressive advance over 
the state of the art in the early 1990s, with the 
analyses getting both more focused and 
integrating theoretical and empirical insights.  In 
general, the economic papers at the conference 
tended to be skeptical of aggregate benefits (still 
focused on the fishing sector) that could result 
from the creation of Marine Protected Areas. 
 
 
An outsider looking in 
 
 Some perspective on the economics of 
MPAs can be gained from matching its issues to 
advances outside this specialized area..  In such a 
spirit, Farrow mentioned several approaches that 
may be more favorable to the creation of MPAs.  
The discussion was divided into three parts:  1) 
concentration versus spreading of economic 
activity, 2) uncertainty and the precautionary 
principle, and 3) the hidden role of the Kaldor-
Hicks potential compensation rule in economics.  
Each is discussed in turn. 
 The flip side of limiting access in order to 
create an MPA is the act of increasing the 
concentration of marine production activity in the 
MPA.  This has parallels to research on the 
location of industry in which calls for a “new 
economic geography” has highlighted the role of 
increasing returns to scale in production, whether 
through organizational inter-dependencies or the 
technology of production itself (e.g. Krugman, 
1995).  This research outside the marine realm 
reinforces work by Helfand and Rubin (1994) that 
asks when externality generating activities should 
be concentrated in one area or dispersed.  This 
line of thought has been largely ignored by 
marine economists (although echos appear in 
some work as by Pezzey, Roberts, and Urdal 
(2000)).  For instance, if standard biomass 
growth models of a logistic sort are used, the 
biological “return to scale3” is mathematically 
confined to be less than or equal to 1 which 
cannot exhibit increasing returns to scale ( a value 
greater than 1).  Age structured models, allowing 
                                                 
2 Sanchirico (2000) provides a more recent review 
focusing on research hypotheses. 
3 Often measured by elasticities of production, the 
ratio of percentage change in output to percentage 
change in an input. 
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Table 1:  Conference Papers and Topic Mapping 
 
 Are MPA’s 
Economically 
Justifiable? 
How does 
econ help 
define the 
boundary 
Role of species 
diversity/survi
val 
Is every MPA an 
island? 
Is passive use 
value 
relevant? 
Distribution and 
political support 
Hannesson √      
Rodwell √  √     
Reithe √       
Holland   √ √   
Alder, et al      √ 
Doering     √ √ 
Ortiz   √   √ 
Pitcher  √      
Beattie √ √  √   
Graham √       √ 
Heyman √     √ 
Msiska       
Dropkin        √ 
Charles   √   √ 
Boncoeur √  √    
Cox √ √  √   
Nsiku √  √    
Chuengpagdee      √ 
Hall     √ √ 
Rudd  √ √    
Silk      √ 
Sumaila √      
Arnason √      
Botsford  √  √   
Sanchirico √ √     
Roberts √   √   
MacDiarmid  √     
Fauzi      √ 
Farrow √  √   √ 
Number of 
papers 
16 7 9 6 2 13 
 
 
 
different returns to scale in different patches (e.g. 
Guénette and Pitcher, 1999), would be more 
consistent with what has led to economic 
concentration in other fields of study.  
Economists and marine biologists may be talking 
past each other until the models capture this 
central element. 
 The theme of stock and other uncertainty 
received more, although not dramatic, emphasis 
at the conference.  To the extent that the 
economic models address uncertainty, they tend 
to stay within a framework of asking if expected 
benefits exceed expected costs.  Recent advances 
in analyzing investment synthesized by Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994) suggest that the standard 
economic decision rule is incorrect when 
uncertainty and irreversibility exist.  Depending 
on who has the right of the status quo between 
maintaining the level of fish stocks or the level of 
fish harvesting, a formal precautionary rule can 
emerge in the new paradigm such that one should 
establish an MPA unless the costs to fishers are 
significantly higher than the expected benefits of 
the MPA, not just equal to or greater than the 
benefits.  The outline of the approach is to 
consider that there are stochastic and irreversible 
costs from overfishing (shut-down or extinction) 
as well as stochastic benefits from continuing to 
fish.  In an analysis parallel to that of investing in 
safety  by Hayakawa and Farrow (2000)  a 
quantitative and empirically based precautionary 
decision rule results from expected value 
maximization.  Analyses that omit uncertainty, 
delayability, and irreversibility may be basing 
marine management decisions on the wrong 
benefit-cost criteria. 
 Finally, the conference interest in 
distributional impacts has a parallel in recent 
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work in  benefit-cost analysis.  Distributional 
analysis has long been the weak point of standard 
analysis, typically using the Kaldor-Hicks 
potential compensation criteria.  Recent emphasis 
on environmental justice and sustainability 
suggest that the potential criteria should be 
replaced with actual compensation criteria 
(Farrow, 1998).  Concerns for both intra and 
inter-generational fairness suggest stronger 
grounds for compensating those who lose from a 
policy action than is typically considered in 
economic analysis.  Thus case studies in local 
benefits and costs can be linked to larger studies 
of the economics of MPAs. 
 
 
New “emerging” economics of MPAs 
 
 While not an official requirement for a 
degree, economists implicitly take a modified 
Hypocratic Oath along the lines of “Above all, do 
not reduce efficiency.”  Economists are rightly 
skeptical that many proposals that sound good to 
some stakeholders will fail a broader test.  At the 
same time, new approaches in economics are 
questioning the universal application of: standard 
interior (convex) solutions to real world 
problems, decision criteria that ignores 
uncertainty and irreversibility, and distribution.   
 The research at the conference 
represented large strides over just a few years ago 
although fundamental issues remain.  The 
exciting aspect of this evolving area is that for the 
moment, a good slogan still beats good analysis.  
However, advances in the synthesis of the natural 
and social sciences may yet lead to the 
compelling, empirically consistent analysis that 
provide a rational framework for managing our 
marine assets wisely. 
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Comments 
 
Reg Watson 
I would like to strongly support what Scott said about 
treating uncertainty.  Fisheries modelers tend to use 
biomass dynamic (simple production) models in an 
effort to get biological modeling out of the way so they 
can get to the more complex economic modeling they 
wish to address, but this leaves out important things 
like recruitment, the influence long runs of bad 
(autocorrelated) years, and overfishing. These sorts of 
approaches cannot handle these things so their results 
naturally show that MPAs cannot offer protection 
against these risks.  If these factors are added into the 
models, it will make a big difference. 
 
Sean Hastings 
I appreciate the distinction you made regarding 
approaches to the presentations.  When we take our 
models to the policy makers, it becomes an issue of why 
we should not set MPAs as opposed as to why we 
should, and we still have a long way to go with our 
persuasion.  We should integrate as many factors as we 
can in MPAs, not just talk about them in relations to 
fisheries. 
 
Scott Farrow 
What do economists add to this?  I think it is our 
fixation on externalities.  I think bringing passive 
values to this issue is one approach.  There are other 
values involved outside of fisheries.  In terms of a 
benefit/cost analysis, we should carry these other 
values along in every analysis.  Set them at zero if you 
do not believe they have much impact on MPAs, but do 
not ignore them. 
 
Louis Botsford 
The talk I gave on persistence analysis, though I 
applied it to fisheries, also applies to other species and 
habitats associated with MPAs. 
